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ABSTRACT

A host of research has shown that those who are nonreligious tend to outscore those who
are religious on measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. The prevailing explanation for
this phenomenon is that nonreligious people are more adept at overriding their initial intuitions,
thus leading to their increased skepticism of intuitive supernatural beliefs. However, the
argument is raised in this investigation that the current measures of cognitive reflection in the
field may not encapsulate the totality of dual-process thinking. Just as math students outperform
upper-level psychology students on measures of cognitive reflection related to their discipline
(Study 1), so, too, may religious individuals outperform nonreligious individuals on measures of
cognitive reflection relating to their discipline of familiarity: religion (Study 2). While support
for this second hypothesis was wanting, special considerations should be given to find measures
of cognitive reflection that appeal to the unique experiences of specific groups in question.
Keywords: cognitive reflection, dual-process theory, religion
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION

Everybody is a genius. But if you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree, it will live its
whole life believing that it is stupid. – Anonymous quote often attributed to Albert
Einstein

Take a moment to imagine the life of a talented flutist preparing for a concert. As she
absorbs herself in her piece in her practice room, she feels a sense of accomplishment. After
hundreds of hours of practice, her fingers can now dance across the keys with ease. Her breath is
in sync with the rhythm of the piece, and the music she creates comes to life in a way that
engages her focus and enthralls her soul. She knows how to play this piece, and she is ready for
her concert. After a long and satisfying practice session, she rewards her efforts with a nightly
jog. As she makes her way past the neighborhood basketball court, she remembers the middle
school days when she tried her hand at the sport, but failed miserably. She was certainly tall and
physically fit enough to excel, but for some reason, even after tireless nights of tribulation, she
could not work her way around the court as her other teammates could. It was not from a lack of
motivation, because she frequently watched basketball on T.V. and had the internal drive to get
better, nor was it from a lack of practice, because she used her allowance to take lessons from
experienced coaches and spent many hours shooting hoops on her own. Rather, despite her
potential, her motivation, and her effort, basketball was just a sport that she simply could not
master. With a frustrated sigh, her focus returns to the jog and the Christmas music blaring in her
1

earbuds. She finds herself enjoying the music, not because she is capable of realizing the melodic
progression or the complexities of the chords, but because the sounds stir her of their own
accord. She loves music. This fact is why she pursued music professionally in the first place, but
unlike basketball, she became good at playing the flute after practice. She was made to be a
flutist. So, with a newfound solace, she passes the basketball court and the memories of her
failures, knowing that she is on the right path.
If society were such that one’s intellectual worth was determined by how well one played
basketball, this flutist would have been considered stupid. Thankfully, society exists in a
pluralistic state that recognizes that one’s poor performance in one domain does not necessitate
that one’s performance in another, even related, domain will likewise be unsatisfactory. For
example, even though the flutist had poor hand-eye coordination and spatial awareness when
playing basketball, she still had superb dexterity when it came to playing the flute. Similarly, she
had incredible gifts in musical performance but was incapable of dissecting music into its
components by ear. Again, it is simply folly to assume that one’s ability or performance in one
domain will match their ability or performance within a different domain or within the same
domain but with different circumstances or contexts. A note of caution to remember, which is the
central theme of this thesis, is that people with diverse abilities, backgrounds, and interests can
and do perform better on tasks that are directly relevant to their specific abilities, backgrounds,
and interests. In other words, fish are quite mobile and agile, but only if they are directed to
swim in the water, not if they are directed to climb a tree.
The specific topic of interest for this thesis is the cognitive science of religion. Namely,
the notion that nonreligious individuals are more reflective thinkers than religious individuals is
challenged. This potentially paradigm-shifting research is important, because there is an implicit
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stigma among psychologists and scientists that religious individuals are intellectually inferior to
atheists and agnostics in measures of intelligence, calculation, and analytical thinking (Nyborg,
2009; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016b; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). While
many studies show this intellectual disparity between the religious and nonreligious using current
measures, and certainly the quality and quantity of evidence in favor of this phenomenon is
robust, it is not the case that all relevant measures have been considered. Perhaps there is only
one hypothetical measure of analytical thinking or one way of thinking that religious individuals
do better on or are better at than their nonreligious counterparts, but even one is enough. The
point is that such a finding would significantly shift the narrative from one of absolutism to one
of nuance. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the extent to which this nuance is warranted by
creating and evaluating one potential measure of analytical thinking within a domain that favors
the abilities, backgrounds, and interests of religious individuals.
This introduction serves as a map to the imagination, guiding the reader through a story
that explains the importance of the issue at hand. The tail of end the map, this paragraph, should
serve as final directions for how to navigate through the rest of the thesis. Chapter II contains a
detailed account of the literature and history of the topics and includes definitions of terms, like
religion, disbelief, intelligence, cognitive reflection, and the content effect; examples of the
intellectual differences between religious and nonreligious individuals; counterexamples of how
context changes performance on cognitive measures; and a description of the gap in the literature
that needs to be filled. Chapters III, IV, and V describe the method, results, and conclusions of
Study 1 where the effect of context was tested with math-based questionnaires. A rationale for
Study 2 is also included in this section. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, in turn, describe the method,
results, and conclusions of Study 2 where a novel scale, the Religious Reflection Scale, was
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tested among a sample of religious and nonreligious individuals. Chapter IX is a final discussion
section where all the pieces from the literature review and the conclusions of Studies 1 and 2 are
synthesized into a cohesive summary. Suggestions for future research are also included in this
chapter.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Before diving into the rationale for the current research, one must have a detailed
understanding of the history and context of the current topic. Unfortunately, as is the case with
every important subject, the background information is vast and can be daunting. To ease this
inevitable discomfort, this chapter was crafted in a way that funnels this wealth of information
into comprehensible and logically-organized segments. First, key terms and concepts are
introduced. Next, the current paradigm between religious belief and cognitive ability is described
with multiple examples. After that, alternative examples of the effect of context and content on
decision making are reviewed. Finally, all the evidence is coalesced into a rationale section
where the purpose of the current research studies is stated.

Key Terms and Concepts

Religion and the Disbelievers
Religion is extremely prevalent in today’s society. Since the 1940’s, roughly 90% of U.S.
respondents have reported belief in a God, and since the early 1990s, about 50-60% of U.S.
respondents would claim that religion is “very important” in their own lives (Gallup, 2017).
Despite its ubiquity, there is considerable debate among philosophers and psychologists on what
religion actually is (for an overview, see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009). Is it a belief system? A
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way of living? An association with a particular group or creed? An experience with the divine?
All or none of the above? There is no settled, absolute definition of religion, but there are some
recurring concepts people have in mind when they think of the word “religion” that deserve
appreciation.
In a broad sense, religion can be seen as a search for meaning (Hood et al., 2009). Such a
search will involve cognitions, motivations, and sociality. The cognitive search for meaning is
one’s attempts to comprehend what life is all about, including why certain events occur and how
to best get along with others. Beliefs in deities or other transcendent entities act as solutions to
the often chaotic nature of the world. The motivational search for meaning is about one’s need to
control or predict what will happen, even if the inevitable outcome is undesirable. Feelings of
self-control or control in general are often enhanced through prayers, rituals, or faith. The social
embeddedness of meaning is concerned about the need to belong. Religion does not occur in a
vacuum, and it is often through connectivity and communality within institutions that individuals
find purpose. Religion involves all three modes of meaning making.
Even with this breakdown, the concept of religion is still somewhat vague. For instance,
one could claim that being a fan of a particular sports team could be considered a type of
religion, as such a fan could find meaning in rooting for her team every week and justify that
meaning through her thoughts (“my place is being a fan of this team”), her motivations (“I feel
fulfilled by rooting for this team, and my contributions can help them win”), and her social
relationships (“I have fellow fans who share my desires to see our team succeed”). Few readers
would recognize such a scenario as being prototypical of religion, even though it would meet the
minimum criteria. There must be something missing. One central aspect that is prevalent in most
religious traditions, though, and that is not represented by the sports fan analogy, is the divine.
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What separates religion from any casual meaning-making system, at least in most
Western traditions, is the shared belief in the divine or the supernatural (Cragun, Hammer, &
Nielsen, 2015; Hood et al., 2009). These supernatural entities are typically called god(s), angels,
demons, and spirits, and they often influence circumstances in the world or provide moral
guidance through sacred texts or prophets. The inclusion of the divine is important, because it
commonly separates religion from nonreligion (Harrison, 2006). A sports fan could not be
considered religious by virtue of the fact that she does not incorporate the supernatural in her
fanhood. Granted, she could be considered superstitious. Just as a pigeon could be fooled into
thinking there was a causal relationship between its erratic behavior and the presentation of food
in Skinner’s classic experiments on superstitions (Skinner, 1948), so, too, could the sports fan
believe wearing her lucky socks to home games increases the chances of her favorite team
winning. The forces that supposedly influence such situations could be considered transcendent,
other worldly, or beyond the natural world, and by definition, such forces would be considered
supernatural. However, the erroneous equivocation between fate or luck and the term
“supernatural” muddies the waters. The supernatural, at least in this thesis, will be used in
reference to entities outside of space and time that are well-established within common Western
religious traditions (e.g., gods, angels, demons, miracles, heaven, hell, etc.), not in reference to
transient superstitions or forces that would better fit within the confines of spirituality (which is
discussed later).
Another hallmark of religion worthy of acknowledgement is ritual. Many religions
involve commonly repeated practices, or rituals, and include acts such as prayer, meditation,
incantations, attending religious services, reading religious texts, contributing money to religious
causes, and observing religious holidays (Hood et al., 2009). These practices can occur in
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isolation or among a collective body among other religious members, and they usually carry
symbolic significance. For example, in some Christian traditions, members will partake of bread
and wine in remembrance of the Last Supper taken by Jesus Christ and his disciples before his
ensuing arrest, torture, and crucifixion. While this ritual may take different forms and have
different symbolic meanings, it is well-established in the Christian faith (Woodhead, Fletcher,
Kawanami, & Smith, 2002). Taken as a whole, religion involves beliefs (typically about the
supernatural) and behaviors that are incorporated into a cognitive, motivational, and social search
for meaning. This definition for religion may not be the most robust or the most familiar to most
readers, and it is certainly not the only one (Harrison, 2006), but it will suffice for the purposes
of this thesis insofar as it demonstrates that religion is foundational to peoples’ lives and
encompasses both beliefs and behaviors.
Now that religion has been (somewhat) defined, it would be sensible to describe a related,
and just as important, demographic: the nonreligious. As a whole, those who are nonreligious do
not subscribe to the beliefs and behaviors of any particular religious tradition. While this
definition appears simple at the outset, it is really fairly complex. For instance, is someone who
attends religious ceremonies of a particular tradition regularly but does not believe in the tenets
of that tradition truly a nonreligious individual? Likewise, if an individual believes in the
truthfulness of specific religious creeds but does not practice any of its rituals, is he or she also a
nonreligious individual? The answers to these questions are unclear and depend largely on how
terms are defined. The tricky delineation between belief and behavior is reminiscent of the
familiar and decades-old debate between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity (Allport & Ross,
1967), though for the sake of this thesis, the motivation behind one’s religious orientation is not
as important as the objective content of their orientations. The analogy, though, that one’s
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ritualistic actions are not the same as one’s personal convictions, is what stands. Those who are
nonreligious in terms of belief are not necessarily the same people who do not participate in
religious activities, and vice-versa. My focus, however, is specifically on the subset of
nonreligious individuals who do not believe religious tenets and who typically do not engage in
other religious rituals: the disbelievers.
Those who do not believe the tenets of religion are disbelievers or nonbelievers
(Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), but as will be demonstrated in a moment, even this definition is
not as simple as it appears. Because belief in a god is common among many religions, those who
disbelieve are often misconstrued as atheists. However, atheism is a response to the singular
issue of whether or not one believes that a god exists. To put it more plainly, an atheist is one
who does not believe in god(s) or believes there are no gods (Cliteur, 2009), so by this definition,
one could believe the tenets of a conventionally nontheistic religious tradition, like Buddhism,
and still be an atheist. Similarly, one could claim to not know whether or not god(s) exist (i.e.,
identify as an agnostic) and still also be an atheist by disbelieving in said god(s), as atheism is in
reference to belief and not knowledge. Finally, one could disbelieve many central themes of a
religion and be a theist, as could be the case with the Christian who believes that a God exists but
is not convinced hell exists or that belief in Jesus is a central criterion for salvation. Are all three
aforementioned personas nonbelievers? Well, yes, in some sense, given that every single one of
them would disbelieve at least some critical element of a typical religion, but it would be
improper to claim that they all disbelieve religious claims to the same degree. Just as there are
nuances to explore with the nonreligious demographic, there is a spectrum of disbelief to explore
within the disbelieving demographic (Silver, 2013).
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To make matters not only conceptually tangled but practically difficult as well, at least in
terms of measurement, there is a stigma among religious groups against those who would
identify as atheist (Doane & Elliott, 2014; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006). The problem
extends to disbelievers or other nonreligious individuals as well (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013).
In other words, even if there were conceptual clarity on what was meant by the terms atheist and
disbeliever, the fact that people do not like identifying with these nonreligious affiliations makes
measuring these populations troublesome. Despite theoretical complications and measurement
shortcomings, though, these terms still have utility. For the sake of clarity in this thesis, the term
nonreligious will henceforth be a descriptor of those who primarily do not subscribe to or
affiliate with any religion in particular, though said individuals may not entirely distance
themselves from all beliefs or practices. The term disbelievers will likewise be viewed as a
subset of nonreligious individuals who do not believe religious tenets, though it typically refers
to agnostics and/or atheists who reject belief in (or claim to not have knowledge of) the existence
of god(s).
Spirituality is another term within the religion-nonreligion juncture that deserves
consideration, but it is only briefly described here for the sake of saying what it is and why it will
not be featured further in this thesis. To begin, spirituality has many definitions and is
meaningful to believers and nonbelievers alike, but in short, spirituality is often regarded as
one’s personal quest for “the sacred” (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2002; Zinnbauer et al., 1997).
This journey may or may not explicitly involve the supernatural or the divine but it almost
always entails personal feelings of interconnectedness, wholeness, and meaning in life (Cragun
et al., 2015). While religion is usually tied to institutions or rituals, spirituality does not require
such a framework and is more personal and subjective (Hood et al., 2009). It is certainly

10

prevalent in society too, as between 50-80% of individuals across different cultures consider
themselves as either spiritual and not religious or equally religious and spiritual (Streib, Silver,
Csöff, Keller, & Hood, 2011). While an interesting and conceptually-relevant topic, spirituality
will not be explored further because of the limited scope of this investigation. I am primarily
concerned about the supernatural religious beliefs that people have, and while there is
considerable overlap between the two domains (i.e., a religious person and spiritual person may
both profess belief in a Higher Power), I am not going to focus on whether or not those beliefs
are tied to personal orientations towards the sacred. Such a discourse deserves another thesis in
itself.

Intelligence
An exploration of cognitive abilities would be incomplete if it did not first include a short
review of intelligence. The notion of intelligence, at least in its modern form as a measurable
concept, first appeared between the 19th and 20th centuries with the work of Alfred Binet (Binet,
Beaunis, des Bancels, Simon, & Piéron, 1903; Binet & Simon, 1916; Reisberg, 2013). Binet and
his colleagues were directed by the French minister of public instruction to identify children who
were not performing well in school and could benefit from special attention. In order to do so,
they had to devise a measure that would distinguish the intellectual capacities of those who were
performing as expected from those who were not. Such a measure had to include a wide range of
tasks associated with cognitive functioning (e.g., copying a drawing, repeating back a string of
digits, reasoning through math problems, etc.), as someone with strong intellectual prowess
would theoretically be able to complete all or most of them (and not just get lucky with a
couple). Likewise, they reasoned that someone who scored low on all the tasks would, by
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comparison, be in need of remedial education. The raw score for each student’s composite
performance on all of these tasks was regarded as their “mental age”. This score was compared
to their “chronological age,” and the ratio, or quotient, between a student’s mental age and
chronological age (multiplied by 100) was that child’s intelligence quotient, or IQ. Scores around
100 would indicate higher intelligence, whereas scores significantly lower than or higher than
100 would indicate deficits or advancements in intellectual ability, respectively. This system of
calculating IQ scores was meant to be intuitive and simple. For example, a 15-year-old child who
received a mental age score of 20 (i.e., who’s intellectual capacity was that of an average 20year-old) would have an overall IQ score of approximately 133, and this score would be
appraised as significantly above average. Since Binet’s time, a number of social scientists have
created a host of popular intelligence measures for children and adults alike (see Reisberg, 2013).
They all theoretically tap into this concept of intelligence. However, what does intelligence
actually mean?
Unfortunately, there is no one set definition for intelligence upon which every scientist
would agree (Legg & Hutter, 2007). To one, it could mean an underlying capacity to think and
solve problems, and to another, it could mean one’s propensity to learn and adapt to new
environments. One psychologist (perhaps glibly) wrote that “intelligence is what is measured in
intelligence tests” (Boring, 1923, p. 35). Truly, there is a lack of consensus among the scientific
community on what intelligence is. One comprehensive definition, though, that will suffice for
the purposes of this thesis, was collected from over 50 psychologists. It follows:
Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves
the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not nearly book learning, a
narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and
deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings – “catching on,” “making
sense” of things, or “figuring out” what to do (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13).
12

Indeed, intelligence is a description of cognitive ability. In trying to determine what
intelligence is, it may be worthwhile to also describe what it is not. For instance, intelligence, by
the above definition, is not a physical skill; rather, it is a cognitive propensity to think and
reason. Intelligence is also not specific to one domain of knowledge. One could think or reason
about car mechanics and be demonstrating just as much intellectual ability as one who is solving
complex calculus problems. Taken together, though, intelligence is cognitive fortitude or ability.
It is a general term for how well one can think.
Intelligence is often regarded as hierarchical (Reisberg, 2013), with general intellectual
ability (often notated as g) covering all mental abilities. In other words, among different
specialized abilities, like language and quantitative reasoning, there is a general mental ability, g,
that pervades. This underlying mental ability, while important, is actually not the central focus of
this thesis. Rather, it is the subcomponents of intelligence. One model, called Sternberg’s
Triarchic Theory of Intelligence, delineates between three such subcomponents, or aspects, of
intelligence: creative, practical, and analytical (Sternberg, Castejón, Prieto, Hautamäki, &
Grigorenko, 2001). Creative intelligence involves being able to discover new ideas and solve
novel problems. Practical intelligence involves being able to sensibly react and adapt to realworld problems. Analytical intelligence involves analyzing and evaluating ideas and information.
The hierarchical nature of intelligence is addressed here, because from this last subcomponent,
analytical intelligence, the concept of cognitive reflection emerges.

Cognitive Reflection and Dual-Process Theory
In terms of definitions, Sternberg’s analytical intelligence is very nearly the same thing as
cognitive reflection. Analytical intelligence refers to the ability to reason critically (Sternberg et
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al., 2001), whereas cognitive reflection refers to the propensity to resist reporting the first
response that comes to mind (Frederick, 2005). A key distinction to make here between the two
concepts is that the former is about cognitive ability while the latter is about cognitive thinking
style (Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Stanovich, 2012). With analytical intelligence (and also general
intelligence), the important component is processing capacity. It is about the efficiency with
which one can calculate the solution to a problem and is largely algorithmic. It is about ability.
For example, a librarian with high analytical intelligence could be given a task of, say,
rearranging the books on her bookshelf and would be able to categorize them systematically and
efficiently by topic, color, and size. With cognitive reflection, the important component is
disposition (Stanovich, 2012). In other words, it is about one’s proclivity or willingness to
engage in analytical thinking, depending on the situation or the individual. To use the example of
the librarian again, she could potentially decide not organize the books by virtue of the fact that
the task was too tedious. She would certainly have the right amount of cognitive ability to
complete the task, but in this case, her cognitive reflection (evidenced by her dispositional
impatience) would be too low to do so. This example illustrates the important fact that one’s
cognitive ability, or intelligence, is separate from one’s cognitive style, or willingness to use
their intelligence, and cognitive reflection is primarily about the latter.
There are many synonyms for cognitive reflection: analytical thinking, reflective
thinking, deliberative processing, etc. These terms interchange, but they all have roots in dualprocess theory (Kahneman, 2003). Dual-process theory has at its core the notion that decisions
are made via two types of processing: Type 1 processing, which is characterized by fast,
autonomous thinking and gut-based intuitions, and Type 2 processing, which is characterized by
slower, more reflective thinking (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2003). Everyone uses
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both types at various times. For instance, one could engage in Type 1 processing by intuitively
deciding to order a burger at a fast food restaurant and then engage in Type 2 processing when
deliberating over what car to purchase later that afternoon. Neither type is necessarily or wholly
better than the other. When it comes to decision making, engaging in Type 2 processing leads to
less bias and errors in reasoning (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b), but it is not
necessarily the best cognitive route to take in all circumstances. For example, it may be most
wise to follow one’s intuition to run away at the sound of an angry, growling dog just around the
corner. Such a decision would not be fully reasonable, per se, as it would forego further
preponderance of evidence (perhaps the dog was an “all bark and no bite” breed and could be
easily threatened to submission with a show of intimidation), but it need not be rational to still be
useful. The point, though, is that despite its expediency and utility, Type 1 processing pales in
comparison to Type 2 processing when it comes to making decisions without bias or intuition. It
would be helpful now to understand dual-process theory in greater detail and delve deeper into
how these two types of thinking trap one into or allow one to overcome their bias-prone intuitive
thinking.
The dual-process model of analytic engagement follows a three-stage pattern (see Figure
1). In the first stage, intuitive responses are generated from an initial problem or cue. Take, for
instance, a problem posed as the square root of 4. An observer of this problem could intuitively
think of “2” as a response. This response would probably be the quickest, and thus it would be
designated IR1. After generating one or multiple Type 1 intuitive responses, the second stage is
induced: conflict monitoring. In this stage, conflict between Type 1 outputs is either detected or
not detected. If no conflict is detected, either because there are no other outputs besides IR1 or
because conflict-detection “mindware” is not activated, then one moves onto the third stage,
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called final response selection/generation, where IR1 is selected as the final Type 2 response. In
the case of the observer who only thought of 2 as the IR1 to the square root of 4, 2 would be
selected quickly and without much deliberation in this third and final stage. Such a person would
also be deemed an intuitive thinker, as little or no reflective thought was used to make this
decision. This is perhaps the scenario where the most prototypical biases, or errors in thinking,
occur, given that alternative potential sources of error are not considered.

Figure 1

Three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement (Pennycook, Fugelsang,
& Koehler, 2015c)

In Figure 1, AR = alternative response; IR = initial response; T1 = Type 1 “intuitive”
processing; and T2 = Type 2 “analytic” processing. IR’s are numbered to reflect alternative
speeds of generation. IR1 is the most salient and fluent possible response. IRn refers to the
possibility of multiple, potentially competing, initial responses. IRn refers to the possibility of an
alternative response that is grounded in an initial response.
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More Type 2, reflective processing occurs, however, when some conflict between the
initial Type 1 outputs is detected. Take, for instance, the observer who initially thinks of 2 but
then second-guesses his understanding of the square root symbol and momentarily confuses it
with a “squared” symbol, thus leading him to think of 16 as IR2. Such a detection of conflict
from competing IR’s in Stage 1 leads to greater Type 2 reflection in Stage 3 where a decision
must be selected. It is then that either rationalization or decoupling occurs. Rationalization refers
to Type 2 processing where secondary intuitive responses (IR2 or IRn) are only briefly considered
and then rejected in favor of the initial, but sometimes erroneous, intuitive response (IR1).
Rationalization is often a source of bias, as the strongest intuition (i.e., the first) is favored above
all other options. Despite the tendency towards bias, it is regarded as a Type 2 process, because
the reasoning involved is still effortful. In the square root of 4 example, the observer uses
rationalization when he already assumes 2 is the best answer, but spends some time
contemplating 16 just to quickly reject it in light of the preferred answer. In this instance, the
second initial response, IR2 or 16, is not seriously considered and only exists as a means of
bolstering belief in the first initial response, IR1 or 2. Decoupling, which is most often associated
with the concept of cognitive reflection, is a class of Type 2 processing that works to inhibit or
override an intuitive response. It is contrasted with rationalization insofar as it is about falsifying
an initial response, not verifying said initial response. The observer would use decoupling if he
attempts to disprove 2 as the best answer, perhaps by trying to think of numbers that would also
suffice as the square of 4 but would still not be 2. It would be in this moment that he would
realize that 2 is, in fact, not the sole answer, and this attempt at falsifying the initial Type 1
response could yield an alternative response (AR): plus or minus 2. Indeed, +2 and -2, and not
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just +2, is the correct solution to the square root of 4 problem, but it only came about through
deeper cognitive reflection.
While there are complexities and nuances to explore with respect to the concepts
associated with decision making, dual-process theory is quite simple. In essence, it proposes that
there are two kinds of processes in response to problems: intuitive, Type 1 processes that pop
into mind quickly and without deliberation and reflective, Type 2 processes that arise from a
recognition of potential conflict between initial responses. Dual-process theory is highlighted in
this thesis, because it is the theoretical framework behind decision making and is the heart
behind one of the most popular measures of cognitive reflection, the Cognitive Reflection Test.

The Cognitive Reflection Test
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a three-item questionnaire that measures one’s
willingness and ability to override their initial intuitions about a problem and reach a correct,
analytically-derived answer (Frederick, 2005). The CRT measures cognitive reflection and
predicts performance on measures of executive functioning, like heuristics-and-biases tasks and
belief bias syllogistic reasoning tasks, much better than measures of intelligence (Toplak, West,
& Stanovich, 2011). It also predicts performance on a host of other cognitive tasks, including,
but not limited to, ACT performance (Frederick, 2005), performance on calculation choice tasks
(Koehler & James, 2010), objective numeracy (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012),
metacognitive advantage and awareness (Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2013), choosing risk
neutral solutions in risky economic games (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009), avoidance of
paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), endorsement of
evolution (Gervais, 2015), and rejection of pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr,
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Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015a). It also predicts belief in supernatural and religious claims
(Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2016b), but this last relationship will be explored a
little later.
How does the CRT work, though? Why is it so popular? For one, it is easy to administer.
After all, it only contains three items. The correct answers are also accessible, in that the
calculations involved are fairly simplistic. The CRT is valuable to this thesis, though, because it
measures analytic thought within the context of dual-process theory. To illustrate this point,
consider the following item from the CRT.

A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ________ cents.

This problem provokes an intuitive answer, 10 cents, which is incorrect. The correct answer is
actually 5 cents (i.e., if the ball is 5 cents, then a dollar more than the ball, which is the cost of
the bat, is $1.05. Taken together, the ball, which, again, is 5 cents, and the bat, which we’ve
calculated to be $1.05, cost $1.10 in total). The simple algebra of the puzzle becomes clear with
the following setup:

x = price of bat
y = price of ball

write correct equations from information in problem

x + y = $1.10
x = y + $1.00

substitute x

(y + $1.00) + y = $1.10
y + y = $0.10
2y = $0.10
y = $0.05

subtract $1.00 from both sides
add the y’s
divide by 2
plug y back into 2nd equation

x = ($0.05) + $1.00
x = $1.05

solve for x
plug x and y back into 1st equation
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($1.05) + ($0.05) = $1.10

The intuitive answer of 10 cents is rather enticing, because it is easy to add 10 to $1.00 and get
$1.10. Such an initial response is prototypical of Type 1 processing, because it arrives to the
mind quickly and with little effort. An individual unwilling to engage in analytical thinking is
likely to answer with the incorrect 10 cents response and not contemplate the question further. If
an individual wants to think about it a little more, however, they may engage in rationalization or
decoupling. If the individual rationalizes, he or she may quickly add 10 cents to $1.00 to verify
that the final answer is $1.10 without seriously considering other options. If the individual
decouples, which is the stereotypical analytic class within Type 2 processing, he or she may add
10 cents, the intuitive price of the ball, to $1.10, the calculated price of the bat (which is $1.00
more than the price of the ball), and find that answer, $1.20, is incorrect. This mental
contemplation and eventual falsification of the initial IR1 response leads to a juncture where the
individual must figure out a way to leave the intuitive trap. Presumably, he or she could set up a
series of equations and solve for the prices of both items (as was demonstrated above).
Alternatively, he or she could attempt a trial-and-error method where numbers less than 10 are
systematically inputted into the model until 5 cents is found. Either way, such an analytic
individual would be engaging in decoupling if they continue searching for the correct answer.
Thus, one must engage in the three-stage dual-process model of cognitive reflection in order to
get this first question of the CRT correct. The other two items of the CRT likewise have strong
intuitive traps which require reflective effort to overcome.
A key note that needs to be made is that the CRT assesses both cognitive style and ability
(Pennycook & Ross, 2016). It measures cognitive style because it necessarily requires
individuals to initially consider the intuitive, but incorrect, answers. Thus, individuals who
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answer correctly must override their initial intuitions about the problems they are confronted
with in order to solve them and engage in Type 2 reasoning. One could argue that some people
may not fall for these initial intuitive traps, and while theoretically true, the fact that most
individuals miss at least one of the questions of the CRT (and said missed questions usually
contain the intuitive, incorrect response) demonstrates that the initial, intuitive response (IR1) is
usually at least considered, if not outright accepted at the outset (Frederick, 2005; Pennycook,
Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016a). The CRT is also a measure of cognitive ability, because
it requires analytic, intellectual processing to complete. Respondents must have a working
familiarity with math or with systematic ways of thinking in order to solve the problems, and
these processes fall under the umbrella of analytic processing capability. The calculations, while
easily accessible, require intellectual fortitude. Could it be that the CRT is just another measure
of mathematical ability, though? This question raises a contention that will be discussed in the
next section. This current section, however, will conclude with a final thought on the utility of
the CRT.
Despite the fact that the CRT measures both cognitive style and ability, it is mainly used
as a measure of analytic cognitive style (ACS; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2016b).
This claim is evidenced by the fact that one must necessarily engage in Type 2 processing in
order to override their initial responses to the CRT items, unlike other measures of cognitive
ability that do not have this Type 1/Type 2 component. Take, for instance, an item from the
measure of mathematical ability by Galli, Chiesi, and Primi (2008):

The double of ¾ is?
A) 6/8 B) 3/2 C) 9/16 D) 3/8
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The answer to this question requires calculation. One must recall the nature of fractions from
previous mathematics classes and realize that adding three quarters of a quantity to another three
quarters equals 1.5 or 3/2. Such calculation is algorithmic, but does not quire cognitive
reflection. By this, I mean that there is no immediate answer that comes to mind that must be
overridden by nearly everyone in order to find the correct solution. Rather, the purpose of this
item (and other items like it) is to see how well one can use principles of mathematics, not how
well one can override their initial gut feelings. The CRT is also unlike other measures of
cognitive style in that it is performance-based. For instance, there is another measure of cognitive
style, called the Need for Cognition, that measures one’s purported propensity to engage in and
enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). While
related to cognitive reflection, what makes this measure of cognitive style different from the
CRT is that it is a self-report measure. Therefore, it only measures how much one believes they
engage in analytic thinking, not how much one actually engages in analytic thinking. In other
words, despite measuring both cognitive style and ability, the CRT is superior to the Need for
Cognition, at least for the purposes of this thesis, because it includes an element of how people
actually think, not how they think they think.

The CRT and Mathematics: Cognitive Ability and Style
To complement the point that was made in the previous section, there are critics who
propose that the CRT is nothing more than a glorified test of numerical ability (Sinayev &
Peters, 2015; Welsh, Burns, & Delfabbro, 2013). Their argument is that the cognitive reflection
components of the CRT have been over exaggerated and that numeric ability, rather than
cognitive reflection (as measured by the CRT), more aptly predicts performance on decision-
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making outcomes. These claims have been countered by proponents of the CRT who agree that
the CRT is at least partially a measure of numeric ability (Pennycook & Ross, 2016). After all,
the items require mathematical calculation in order to solve correctly. This fact is not a nail-inthe-coffin for the CRT, though. The CRT predicts moral and religious outcomes that are distinct
from numeracy and intimately tied to analytic thinking (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2014b), even when controlling for calculation or other measures of numerical ability.
This, and other evidence of the CRT’s association with non-numeric outcomes, like religion and
use of smart phones (Pennycook et al., 2012), suggests that the evidence founded by critics of the
CRT are, if anything, the exceptions, not the rule (Pennycook & Ross, 2016). Again, nobody is
contending that the CRT only measures cognitive thinking style and does not incorporate some
elements of numeric ability; rather, the argument presented is that the CRT contains components
of analytic reflection that require numeric ability to solve. This fact is important, because it
brings up the implication that the current measures that exist for cognitive reflection are limited.
After all, the most popular and robust one, the CRT, only works within the confines of
mathematical calculation. Are there perhaps other avenues of cognitive reflection that have not
been studied? Put in another way, what would happen if the concepts of cognitive reflection were
taken outside the domain of mathematics and incorporated within another domain of reasoning,
such as, say, religion? This question is central to this thesis and will be explored in more detail in
later sections.

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Factors for Type 2 Processing
There are certain factors that determine whether or not one will engage in analytic
thinking. These factors are categorized into two groups: top-down or bottom-up (Pennycook et

23

al., 2015c). Bottom-up factors are “stimulus driven,” whereas top-down factors are not stimulus
driven and usually incorporate environmental or context factors. For comparison, and to illustrate
the difference between the two factors, consider the bottom-up and top-down delineation in
perception (Reisberg, 2013). With perceptual bottom-up processing, individual features of a
stimulus are evaluated (Selfridge, 1959). Take, for instance, the English word, CLOCK. Bottomup processing theory suggests that in order to recognize this word, one must detect (perhaps
unconsciously) the features of the individual letters, such as the curvature of the first letter, C, or
the vertical and horizontal line elements of the second letter, L, and piece them together to form
letters. These letters in turn become the features that form the word as a whole. Bottom-up
processing in decision making is similar to its perception counterpart insofar as it is based in the
stimulus itself, whether it be in the wording or presentation of the stimulus (which is the problem
to be solved). With perceptual top-down processing, the context is what influences perception,
not the stimulus itself. A classic example of this type processing is shown in Figure 2. The
middle “letter” in both words is actually a symbol that could be interpreted as either H or A. In
other words, the stimulus is the same. However, the context of the words ensures that only THE
and CAT will be read. If one were to misinterpret the ambiguous symbol, one would be left with
TAE CHT (or another nonsensical variant), but because these types of incorrect interpretations
have little to no meaning, especially in comparison to the most meaningful interpretation, THE
CAT, the latter is perceived. Top-down processing in decision making is similar to its perception
counterpart insofar as it is based on context, though context in the decision-making sense refers
to environmental influences and personal dispositions. What follows in this section is a brief
overview of top-down and bottom-up factors in decision making and how these factors either
impede or encourage greater Type 2 processing.
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Figure 2

Depiction of THE CAT perceptual trick that exemplifies top-down processing
(after Selfridge, 1955)

Three top-down factors that influence analytic thinking are type of instruction (Daniel &
Klaczynski, 2006; Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010; Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999),
amount of time given to think (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, &
Johnson, 2000), and individual differences (Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000).
Vadeboncoeur and Markovits (1999) investigated how type of instruction influences
performance in decision making. They gave participants a conditional reasoning task, or one that
required them to consider various “if-then” statements and determine which conclusions
logically followed, and evaluated their performance. In one condition, participants were
instructed to assume the given if-then statements were true and then make conclusions based off
of them. In another condition, participants were given much clearer and thorough instructions on
how to consider the if-then statements but were given the same conclusions from which to
choose. Those who were in the condition that received the more detailed instructions chose the
more logical conclusions than their counterparts who received simple instructions, thus
indicating that merely instructing participants to think more thoroughly on conditional reasoning
task increases reflective thinking. Having enough time to think about problems also increases
reflective thinking. In a study, Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) gave half of their participants 10
seconds to complete a reasoning task and the other half an unlimited amount of time to complete
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the same task. Those with the time constraint were more prone to responding in an intuitive,
belief-influenced way than the other experimental condition who were given more time to reflect
on their answers. Therefore, it appears limiting the amount of time one has to think increases the
amount of intuitive or biased responses they give. Finally, in a host of evidence suggests that
there are individual differences in cognitive reflection capabilities, meaning that some people
have certain dispositions or tendencies that make them better at overriding their intuitive pulls
than others. For instance, males typically tend to score better on the CRT than females
(Frederick, 2005), and performance on typical measures of cognitive ability, like SAT scores, are
moderately and positively correlated with measures of cognitive reflection, though the fact that
some low-scoring SAT takers perform exceptionally well on these cognitive reflection tasks
indicates that performance is not dependent on one’s intellectual capability. Instead, cognitive
reflection is an entity that is related to and perhaps relies on, but is still distinct from,
intelligence. In summary, greater Type 2 processing in problem solving occurs when participants
are instructed to think more thoroughly, when participants are given plenty of time to think, and
when participants are males or score better on measures of cognitive ability, though this latter
observation of individual differences is, indeed, individual-specific.
Introducing a bottom-up change to the stimulus also changes performance on reasoning
tasks. Take, for instance, a modified version of the stereotypical ball and a bat problem
mentioned earlier:

A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents. The banana costs 13 cents more than the bagel. How
much does the bagel cost?
There is not an intuitive answer that immediately jumps out to one’s mind after reading this
question, even though it is fundamentally similar to its predecessor. Instead, one must work
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through the algebra to reach the appropriate solution. When presented this way, Frederick (2005)
reported that more respondents answered it correctly (i.e., responded with “12 cents”) than they
did with the original ball-and-bat problem, which had the erroneous, intuitive pull. Changing the
content of this particular item has likewise had a similar effect across a few studies (De Neys,
Rossi, & Houdé, 2013; Mastrogiorgio & Petracca, 2014). This evidence indicates that the CRT
problems are unique insofar as they have intuitive traps that oftentimes ensnare respondents,
despite evidence that the mathematical computations needed to solve said problems are fairly
accessible. Interestingly, this change of performance happens as a result of an alteration of the
stimulus itself (a bottom-up factor). The same is true of performance on a belief-bias syllogistic
reasoning task, which is another task that measures cognitive reflection. When this task was
presented with nonsensical or meaningless words, participants did better on it than others who
were given the same task with meaningful words and concepts that invoked bias based on their
prior beliefs (Markovits & Nantel, 1989). That is, they were more likely to commit an error in
reasoning by evaluating the merits of a syllogistic argument based off of the believability of its
conclusion, not its logical structure. Taken together, these studies indicate that when the
stimulus, or problem, is changed such that it does not have an intuitive trap or it contains an
intuitive trap that is set without the enticement of an intuitive, prior-belief-based option, it will
allow analytic processing to proceed.
These top-down and bottom-up factors undoubtedly influence one’s propensity to think
analytically. The terms themselves, top-down and bottom-up, are important too, because any
factors that affect Type 2 processing will fall under either of these two categories. Moving
forward, it will be helpful to elucidate to what extent other relatively unexplored factors fit best
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within the two distinguishing categories, though such an analysis is not possible without first
understanding what they mean.

The Content Effect
There is a tendency for subjects to commit logical errors in the Wason card selection task
(described in detail later) when the content they are dealing with is abstract or unfamiliar.
Likewise, when the content presented in the problem is familiar and concrete, subjects make
logical errors much less frequently. This observation is known as the content effect in reasoning
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Cox & Griggs, 1982; Davies, Fetzer, & Foster, 1995).
At first glance, this phenomenon seems to run counter to the belief bias described in the
previous section on bottom-up factors in decision making. After all, the tasks associated with the
two phenomena in question are quite similar: both the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning tasks
and the Wason card selection tasks require deductive reasoning to solve, both have intuitive
solutions that most participants fall prey to unless they are overridden with greater analytical
thinking, and both can incorporate unfamiliar or familiar terms (Cox & Griggs, 1982; Markovits
& Nantel, 1989). Why is it that with the former, changing the stimulus to familiar terms
increases error in response (i.e., belief bias), whereas with the latter, changing the stimulus to
familiar terms instead decreases error in response (i.e., the content effect)? In other words, does
familiarity with the content of a cognitive reflection problem increase or decrease Type 2
processing? This question is puzzling. One could answer it by claiming the problems that
exemplify belief bias and content effect are fundamentally unique, despite their alleged
similarities, and so differences in performance on these tasks are expected. If this is the case,
though, then how could one predict whether belief bias or the content effect will prevail in other
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tasks of cognitive reflection? Another solution, which supposes the efficacy of both camps and
will be explored in the general discussion section of this thesis, is to investigate how both content
and context affect Type 2 processing (Pollard & Evans, 1987).
For now, what is important to remember is that familiarity with the concepts of a problem
changes how well one will perform on that problem. This observation will be critical moving
forward, as the central argument of this thesis is that changing the content of reasoning problems
changes performance. To this end, the content effect will be a global term to refer to times when
familiarity with the content of a reasoning task increases performance and reduces intuitive
responding, whereas belief bias will hereby refer to instances when one’s prior belief instead
decreases performance on reasoning tasks and enhances the power of the intuitive response.

Domain Generality and Specificity
It is worthwhile to take a moment now to distinguish between the content effect and a
related term: domain specificity. When cognitive processing is fashioned by specific pieces of
information or in specific contexts, then it is considered to be domain-specific; by contrast, when
cognitive reasoning incorporates global cognitive processes, then it is considered to be domaingeneral (Beller & Spada, 2003; Roberts, 2008). What makes the content effect different from
domain specificity is that the latter is associated with changes in reasoning processes based on
context. The content effect says nothing about process. It is simply in reference to the tendency
people have to reduce the number of decision-making errors they commit when the content they
are thinking about is familiar to them. Whether or not their processes of reasoning are the same,
or domain-general, between different tasks does not matter. In fact, the type of reasoning is
probably exactly the same, but it gets triggered at different times in different contexts.
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Take the example of a baker who is tasked with sorting cakes in a display case. He would
perhaps start by labeling them and arranging them by size on the counter. Then, he would take
into account color and intrigue of the cakes and think of ways to spatially arrange them such that
the most exciting ones were seen first by customers. Finally, he would place them in the display
case according to this mental schematic. The completion of such a task would take some time
and know-how, but it would presumably be relatively easy for him, given his interest in and
familiarity with cakes. Now, think about how this exact same baker would fare on a similar, yet
different task: organizing books on a display table. He would probably first mentally organize
the books similarly to the cakes, taking size into account first. Next, he would arrange them by
color, intrigue, and overall spatial fit. Finally, he would set up the books according to his
schematic. In terms of processing, the baker would use the same type of systematic thinking for
both tasks. Such consistency in thinking across contents and contexts is domain-general.
However, the new book-organizing task introduces the variable of unfamiliarity. That is, he
would likely not be as proficient at organizing books on the display table by virtue of the fact
that he was not as familiar with how they should be arranged in the first place. Should
bestseller’s go on top? Should some books be displayed standing up, while others should remain
stacked on their backs? Even if he had the foreknowledge to anticipate these ancillary details, his
ability to do so would not take into account his motivation, which could also affect his
performance. Perhaps the task of piling books is not as personally meaningful or relevant to his
own interests, and so while he would have the mental capability to do well, he would falter. The
point of this example is to show that reasoning processes need not be domain-specific, in the
cognitive sense, in order to be influenced by specific environmental or stimulus-based cues. The
content of a problem could just as readily affect motivation or insight without fundamentally
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changing the process of thinking as a whole. Thus, a domain-general process of thinking can be
applied to different scenarios.
The term domain is still troublesome, though, as it can refer to both a mental process or
the referent of a mental process (Pachur & Spaar, 2015). Colloquially, a domain is just a general
area of knowledge about which one can reason. In this sense, psychology could be considered a
domain. Or electronics. Or baseball. So, even though it has a more robust meaning among
cognitive scientists (Roberts, 2008), the term domain will be regarded as a specific context in
which thinking occurs. If domain is to refer to a process of thinking, it will be immediately
followed by either the term specific or general.

The Current Paradigm
Now that many of the important terms have been discussed and defined, the current
paradigm can be introduced. The point of this section is to describe what psychologists have to
say about the relationship between religiosity and cognitive capability, which, simply put, is that
nonreligious individuals tend to have greater intellectual and cognitive reflective capabilities
than religious individuals (Pennycook et al., 2016b). The evidentiary support in favor of this
assertion is strong. However, the fact that empirical data point in one direction does not mean
they prescribe this direction as the only truth. All research has limitations, and all good scientific
hypotheses, if they can be quantified and operationalized, can be challenged. The ending of this
literature review will detail one way in which religious individuals could have the upper-hand on
nonreligious individuals in matters of cognition. But first, the current paradigm.
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Religion and Intelligence
There is significant support for the notion that general intelligence and religiosity are
inversely related to each other. Lewis, Ritchie, and Bates (2011) found that IQ was negatively
correlated with multiple dimensions of religiosity, including religious identification, private
practice, and fundamentalism. Other research found cross-cultural support for this trend,
demonstrating that among 137 different countries, disbelief in God is positively correlated to IQ
(Lynn, Harvey, & Nyborg, 2009). To put these data in the context of mean-level differences, one
large scale study reported that, on average, atheists had IQ scores 5.13 points higher than
religious believers (Nyborg, 2009). Indeed, there is a consensus that higher religiosity is
associated with lower general intelligence, with overall correlations between religious
belief/practice and IQ ranging from -.20 to -.25 (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). Even
though the differences in intelligence between nonreligious and religious individuals are
somewhat marginal and the effect sizes of the negative relationship between religion and IQ are
modest, the trend is that nonreligious individuals appear to have, on average, somewhat greater
intellectual capabilities than religious individuals.

Religion and Cognitive Reflection
Cognitive reflection, which is one’s ability to check and detect intuitive errors according
to the dual-process theory, is also strongly tied to religious belief (Pennycook et al., 2012).
Cognitive reflection deserves attention in the scope of this investigation, because it may actually
be a better predictor of religiosity than intelligence (Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al.,
2016b; Shenhav et al., 2012). The evidence for this claim was laid out succinctly by Pennycook
(2014), who explained that the CRT, the most popular measure of cognitive reflection, was
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shown to positively predict religious beliefs across a number of studies. Importantly, though, this
predictive capability remained significant when controlling for cognitive ability, as measured by
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Matrix Reasoning Test and the Shipley Vocabulary Test,
age, gender, openness to experience, and extraversion (Shenhav et al., 2012). Another study of a
similar nature showed similar results. When controlling for variables such as sex, age,
conservatism, education, religious engagement, and, of course, cognitive ability (as measured by
the Wordsum verbal intelligence test), measures of ACS, which included the CRT and another
purported measure of cognitive reflection, significantly predicted religious beliefs (Pennycook et
al., 2012).
Finally, in a recent meta-analysis of over 20 studies containing over 15,000 total
participants, Pennycook et al. (2016b) found that performance on a number of measures of ACS,
including the CRT, belief-bias syllogisms, and base-rate neglect problems, correlated negatively
with various measures of religious belief. In their own series of four studies with over 1,000
participants (that were included in the aforementioned meta-analysis), they found that purported
atheists scored the highest on the cognitive reflection measures. As the gradation continued from
atheist, to agnostic, and to belief in a personal deity, participants scored increasingly lower,
suggesting that, on the spectrum of affiliations relating to belief of God, those who deviate more
from the conventional belief in a personal deity tend to be more reflective and more prone to
overriding their initial intuitions than their more religious counterparts. Additionally, ACS
remained a significant predictor of religious belief when numeracy and verbal intelligence were
controlled for in a multiple regression analysis. This final meta-analysis and four-study
investigation acts as a proverbial lighthouse for the current paradigm: across multiple studies and
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measurement parameters, nonbelieving individuals are more reflective thinkers than religious
believers.

Alternatives to Current Paradigm: A Case for Conditional Reasoning
The main argument posed in this thesis is that familiarity with certain tasks gives certain
individuals or groups of individuals advantages over others. As was just reviewed, the current
paradigm suggests that religious individuals are generally not as analytical or reflective as their
nonreligious counterparts. However, this conclusion is made based off of performance on only a
few tasks (Pennycook et al., 2015b). The first is the CRT, which was discussed in an earlier
section. The second is the base-rate neglect task, which requires participants to suppress intuitive
stereotypes about groups of people and select answers in favor of statistical probabilities. The
third is the belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning task, which prompts participants to assess the
validity of syllogistic arguments, despite the fact that the correct answers to these syllogisms
come in conflict with their intuitive beliefs. These are the most popular and often-used measures
of cognitive reflection, and overwhelmingly, nonreligious individuals perform better on them
than religious individuals (Pennycook et al., 2016b). However, the existence of even one
measure of cognitive reflection in which religious individuals consistently outperformed
nonreligious individuals would add nuance to the current paradigm, suggesting instead that
nonreligious individuals are more reflective than religious individuals in most or some measures
of cognitive reflection.
The purpose of this section is to explore instances in which familiarity with certain
concepts or cultures influenced performance on reasoning tasks. I argue that the process of
reasoning, while perhaps structured under domain-general “mindware”, is multifaceted and
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selective. Intuitive and reflective inclinations in decision making are subject to the influence of
individual skills/talents, group cultures, individual familiarities, and the contents of the tasks
themselves. In short, reasoning is conditional.

Multiple Intelligence Theory
In his seminal work, Frames of Mind; The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, Howard
Gardner proposed that there are eight different intelligences (Gardner, 1983, 1999). Three of the
eight intelligences, visual-spatial, verbal-linguistic, and logical-mathematical, were essentially
reiterations of the traditional model of IQ. However, Gardner argued for the existence of more
intelligences, such as musical-rhythmic intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence,
interpersonal intelligence, and naturalistic intelligence, that had functional, culturally-valued
outcomes and could helped people solve problems. Importantly, the inclusion of such new
intelligences partly revolutionized the way teachers and educators evaluated the abilities of their
students. For instance, the student athlete who excelled in basketball but still received low scores
on math tests in school could still be regarded as having a high degree of intelligence, though just
in a different domain (i.e., bodily-kinesthetic). So, too, could the quiet mathematical prodigy find
solace in having high logical-mathematical intelligence but low interpersonal intelligence. This
framework was meant to be inclusive and show that everyone had unique abilities above-andbeyond the rigid structure of academic intelligence. Indeed, after its inception, multiple
intelligence (MI) theory gained positive support among students, teachers, and parents who
regarded it as a happier alternative to the idea that there is only one kind of “smart” (DíazLefebvre, 2004; Mettetal, Jordan, & Harper, 1997).
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Among academics, however, MI theory did not gain as much support, with many critics
challenging its theoretical foundations, its definitions, and its empirical backing (Visser, Ashton,
& Vernon, 2006; Waterhouse, 2006b; White, 2008). For example, in one study, intercorrelations
between performances on verbal and nonverbal versions of the eight intelligences were quite
high (Visser et al., 2006). In other words, participants who did well in one domain, like musicalrhythmic intelligence, were fairly likely to succeed in other domains, like verbal-linguistic
intelligence. This evidence appears to run counter to MI theory, which suggests that participants
who do well in one domain would not predictably do as well in other domains. Gardner has
responded to this and other waves of criticisms (Gardner & Moran, 2006), which has, in turn,
sparked more controversy (Waterhouse, 2006a).
Whether or not MI theory holds significant merit for intelligence as a whole is still up for
debate, but the key takeaway is that it was an attempt to undermine the current order at that time.
And it succeeded, insofar as it raised the question of individual differences in intelligence theory.
Even though the norm seems to be that general intelligence pervades among many skillsets and
abilities (Visser et al., 2006), this fact is the trend, not the absolute standard. Part of Gardner’s
theory was based on the savant, or the genius who excelled significantly above average in one
domain, despite deficiencies in others (Gardner, 1983). Such individuals are extraordinary and
uncommon. They do not necessarily signify a trend. However, they do indicate the possibility of
individual differences, or the possibility that the talents of some individuals are varied (even in
the cognitive domain). Such diversity is meaningful, as it gives rise to the idea that measures of
cognitive ability are limited if they do not take into account the unique life experiences of the
individual. Such a distinction becomes much more apparent in the next example.
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The BITCH-100 Test
In order to demonstrate that mainstream intelligence tests were culturally biased, Robert
Williams developed the Black Intelligence Test for Cultural Homogeneity (BITCH-100;
Williams, 1972). This test was meant to be a measure of intelligence for African-American
individuals pertaining to their unique language, attitudes, and lifestyles. As such, its items were
culture-specific, not culture-fair. A culture-fair test would be designed to not give any particular
groups or individuals advantages over others; by contrast, a culture-specific test would be
designed to give unfair advantages to certain groups. As a culture-specific test, the BITCH-100
was designed to give Black individuals an advantage over White individuals, and it did. In the
original sample comparing 100 White individuals to 100 Black individuals on the BITCH-100,
the Black individuals outscored the White individuals by a mean of 36.00 points. This effect has
been repeated multiples times with the same results: when given a normal IQ test, White
individuals outscore Black individuals, but when given the culture-specific BITCH-100, Black
individuals outscore White individuals (Matarazzo & Wiens, 1977; McNiel, 1975).
Clearly, the cultures and experiences of particular groups of individuals play crucial roles
in how well they perform on reasoning tests, especially if those tests do not take into account
these unique narratives. The BITCH-100 serves as a sober reminder that participants must be
familiar with the content they are presented with in order to have a chance of demonstrating their
cognitive prowess. It also demonstrates the case that cognitively disparaged groups of
individuals (e.g., Black individuals) are not as incapable at thinking and reasoning as their
relatively poor performance on test items would indicate. A solution to this problem, which
Williams showed in 1972, is to create measures with items that both require mental fortitude and
are unique to the experiences of these minority groups.
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Wason Card Selection Task
A reasoning task need not pander to one group solely in order to show marked
improvement among participants. Simply changing the nature of the problem to something
familiar is enough. Take, for instance, the Wason card selection task (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;
Wason, 1966). In this task, participants are presented with four cards (two letters and two
numbers) and told that every card has on it a letter on one side and a number on the other (Figure
3). They are also given a rule that they must determine the truth of. One such rule could be “if
the card shows a D on one side [p], then its opposite face must be 3 [q].” They are then instructed
to turn over as many cards (and only as many cards) as is necessary to determine the truthfulness
of this rule. When the problem was presented in this abstract format (see Figure 3, top), only
around 10-25% of participants answered correctly by flipping over the card with the D (p) and
the card with a 7 showing (not q) (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). However, when the context of the
problem was changed and participants were instead asked to determine whether or not actors
were violating social contracts (i.e., by drinking beer while underage) (Cox & Griggs, 1982;
Pollard & Evans, 1987), they answered correctly (p, not q) around 75% of the time (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1992).

Figure 3

Depiction of Wason card selection tasks (images from Cosmides & Tooby, 1992)
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The Wason card selection task demonstrates that there is a content effect to thinking
critically (Davies et al., 1995). That is, when the content of a problem changes such that it
incorporates terms or ideas which are more familiar, performance on the problem increases. This
logic could also be extended to performance on measures of cognitive reflection, because after
all, the Wason card selection task could be considered a type of cognitive reflection task. When
given in its abstract form, most people (~41%) erroneously select p and q (Cox & Griggs, 1982).
In a sense, participants would have to overcome the intuitive pull to select the cards that first
come to mind with the statement of the problem (i.e., determine the truth of the rule “if p, then
q”). Thus, they would have to activate Type 2 processing in order to test their initial response of
p and q, realize it does not work, and then try further alternatives. Such algorithmic processing is
indicative of reflective thinking, and thus, the Wason card selection task is a task of cognitive
reflection. So, altogether, there is evidence that suggests that changing the content of one
measure of cognitive reflection to something familiar increases performance.

Domain-Specificity Preferences in Decision Making
Not only do content effects apply to a very narrow scope of alterations for a specific
measure of reasoning, but there appears to be a spectrum of topics to which intuitive-deliberative
preferences in decision making are applied. Take, for example, the tasks of selecting a mate or
purchasing a new electronic item. Which would influence one to rely on their intuitions? Which
would invoke a greater preference for deliberation? The answer may be a little surprising.
Selecting a mate is associated with more intuitive modes of thinking, whereas buying a new
electronic device is associated with more deliberative modes of thinking. In a study evaluating
how much participants reportedly relied on their intuitions or their deliberations for making
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decision in a number of domains, Pachur and Spaar (2015) found that, in addition to selecting a
mate, people were more likely to select their clothing and choose restaurants based on their
intuitions. Likewise, they were more inclined to use deliberative processing when choosing a
doctor or buying electronic devices. Interestingly, they were equally likely to prefer intuitive and
deliberative processing when making vacation plans, probably because such a judgment required
them to balance their intuitions (e.g.., do they feel they want to go somewhere warm, like a
beach, or somewhere exciting, like an amusement park) with their deliberations (e.g., deciding
how to budget the vacation).
This study illustrates the important point that one’s purported willingness to engage in
intuitive or deliberative thinking is dependent on what one is deciding, even if one is more
inclined to think intuitively or deliberatively overall. For instance, one could hypothetically
claim to be a deliberative thinker in general and apply critical thought to math problems but then
intuitively choose one particular color scheme for an unpainted room because it “looks better”.
The task of painting a room would not invoke the same type of reflective thinking in this
individual. Truly, deliberative processing is selective and contingent on the issue at hand.

The Familiarity Factor
In another example of the effect of content on the ability to reason, college students from
a variety of academic backgrounds were posed three types of formal reasoning problems, which
required use of abstract thought, hypothesis testing, deductive reasoning, and problem-solving to
complete at the formal operations level (De Lisi & Staudt, 1980; Piaget, 1972). The first type
was a physics-based problem that required the participants to systematically isolate the variables
that would change the frequency oscillations of a pendulum. The second type was a political
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socializations concepts task that required participants to make political decisions, justify them,
and then consider opposing viewpoints. The third type was a literary styles analysis task that
required participants to match the literary styles of various works. As expected, the researchers
found that a high percentage of those who were well-versed in physics and mathematics
completed the physics-based task at the formal operations level (~90%) (De Lisi & Staudt,
1980). The political science and English students who were given the same physics-based task
also scored at the formal operations level, but because they were not as familiar with physics, a
lesser percentage of them scored at this highest level (only ~40%). Interestingly, the math and
physics students did not outperform the other students on the other two tasks. Instead, when the
styles of the tasks were switched, those who had a task related to their field of interest did better
than their academic counterparts. That is, a higher percentage of those who were political science
and English majors answered formal operations questions on political socialization and literary
styles, respectively, at the formal operations level compared to everyone else. For a graphical
visualization of this phenomenon, see Figure 4.
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Figure 4

Mean scores on three formal operations tasks by college major groups (taken from
De Lisi & Staudt, 1980)

This pivotal study lays the foundation for the argument posed in this thesis, which is that
familiarity with certain domains of reasoning affects performance on reasoning tasks. This
argument, which is essentially an updated version of the content effect, will be called the
familiarity factor. It is distinct from the content effect in one major way: instead of focusing
purely on bottom-up (i.e., stimulus-based) factors, as the content effect does, the familiarity
factor focuses on both bottom-up and top-down factors. An explanation follows.
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The content effect is based on the fact that changing the stimulus, or the content, of a
reasoning problem changes performance. Namely, in the case of the Wason card selection task,
making the content more familiar to participants increases performance (Cox & Griggs, 1982).
This effect is solely based on bottom-up factors, though. Sure, participants must have some
working knowledge of policing social norms in order to (unconsciously) appreciate the ease of
the age drinking problem over its more difficult abstract counterpart, but such acknowledgement
is readily accessible to all who understand social norms in the first place. Therefore, changing
the content to align with the familiarity of the participant happens nearly ubiquitously, and such
near universality is, for all intents and purposes, a bottom-up phenomenon. By contrast, the
familiarity factor incorporates both bottom-up and top-down processing. To begin, the
familiarity factor depends on the stimulus-in-question changing. In the aforementioned study
with the three types of college students, the stimulus changed from physics-based, to political
science-based, to English-based. However, and most importantly, this change in the stimulus
only had an effect on the participants who belonged to different groups. That is, changing the
stimulus to appeal to the familiarities of each of the three represented groups either changed or
did not change their performance, depending on which group they belonged to. Take, for
instance, the change of the task from physics-based to political science-based. Such a change in
stimulus had a drastic effect on both the physics and math students and the political science
students (i.e., the change hurt the former and aided the latter). The English students, however,
experienced very little change in performance at all. Such a recognition that the content of a
stimulus can alter performance for different groups, based specifically on a top-down factor
delineation, is the familiarity factor.
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Rationale for Studies
I have attempted to demonstrate in this literature review that reasoning is complicated.
Even if reflective thinking follows the three-stage dual-process model (Pennycook et al., 2015c),
the issue remains of when such reflective thinking is invoked. According to one major camp,
analytical thinking, skepticism, and religious disbelief go hand-in-hand (Norenzayan & Gervais,
2013; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2016b), alluding to
the fact that some individuals are more predisposed to thinking reflectively than others.
According to another camp, success in reasoning is based instead on culture, content, and
familiarity (Cox & Griggs, 1982; De Lisi & Staudt, 1980; Matarazzo & Wiens, 1977). The
purpose of these studies is to explore the middle ground between these two camps and challenge
the paradigm set forth by the first camp that religious disbelievers are more reflective thinkers
than religious believers. The purpose of the first study is to replicate the major findings of
Pennycook et al. (2016b) and take the first step to show that the CRT measures cognitive
reflection within the domain of mathematics. The purpose of the second study is to replicate the
major findings of Pennycook et al. (2016b) again and also take the first step to show that a novel
measure of cognitive reflection within the domain of religion, the Religion Reflection Scale, can
invoke reflective thinking in religious individuals on par with their nonreligious counterparts.
Figure 5 illustrates the theoretical basis behind this exploration. The left graph depicts
predicted scores between math majors and psychology majors on the original, math-based CRT
and on a hypothetical “Psych CRT,” which would have questions within the domain of
psychology that measure cognitive reflection. If indeed cognitive reflection occurred
independent of content or familiarity, then upper-level math and psychology students, who
presumably have the same access to higher-level cognitive functioning, would score equally well
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on a general measure of cognitive reflection, as the math-based CRT is purported to be. If,
however, cognitive reflection dependent on content or familiarity, then upper-level math students
would outperform upper-level psychology students if the cognitive reflection task were based in
mathematics, whereas the reverse would be true if the task were based in psychology. Both
versions of the CRT would still measure cognitive reflection, but would do so in the domain of
the discipline in question, which would give an unfair advantage to those individuals who were
most familiar with that domain.

Figure 5

Side-by-side comparison of theoretical basis for Study 1 (left) and Study 2 (right);
CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; CR = Cognitive Reflection

The right graph in Figure 5 depicts the logical extension of the aforementioned argument.
Nonreligious individuals tend to do better than religious individuals on cognitive reflection tasks
that involve math-based reasoning and logic with respect to general facts (Pennycook et al.,
2013; Pennycook et al., 2016b). This pattern, while somewhat marginal, appears to be consistent.
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However, I argue that these tasks may not assess the totality of all domains of cognitive
reflection. Perhaps those who are religious perform poorly on the CRT and other cognitive
reflection tasks because they are less familiar with problem-solving or analytical thinking in the
domain of mathematics or general content syllogistic logic, not because they are less reflective
thinkers overall. It stands to reason that a cognitive reflection task that was designed to measure
cognitive reflection within the domain of religion would yield results consistent with the notion
that religious individuals may think analytically within their familiar domain. Thus, religious
individuals would perform better than nonreligious individuals on a measure of religious
cognitive reflection.

Main Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The major findings of Pennycook et al. (2016b) will replicate. That is,
measures of cognitive reflection will be negatively related to religious belief.
Hypothesis 2: Students in upper-level mathematics courses will score higher on the CRT
than students in upper-level psychology courses.
Hypothesis 3: Religiosity will be positively associated with religious reflection.

Study 1 Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a: The CRT and a measure of analytic cognitive style (ACS; i.e., a
composite score of the original CRT, the additional CRT, and the belief bias in syllogistic
reasoning task) will negatively correlate with religious belief.
Hypothesis 1b: Categorically, atheists and agnostics will outperform theists on all
measures of ACS.
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Hypothesis 1c: ACS will predict religious belief, even when controlling for numeracy,
gender, age, and reported GPA.
Hypothesis 2: Students in upper-level mathematics courses will score higher on the CRT
than students in upper-level psychology courses.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 1 METHOD

Participants
Participants were selected via convenience sampling (class-to-class or student lounge
recruitment) between March 2017 and April 2017 from the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga (UTC), a public university located in southern United States. There were 110
participants: 82 from upper-level psychology courses (80% female) and 28 (36% female) from
upper-level mathematics courses. All participants answered all questions. The average age was
24.20 years (SD = 7.637) and the average reported GPA was 3.34 (SD = 0.439) out of a possible
4.0. Most participants were seniors (81.8%) and most identified as having a belief in a personal
God or higher power (74.5%). Twenty-eight students were math majors (e.g., mathematics,
actuary science, applied statistics, etc.) with experience in upper-level math concepts, whereas
the remaining 82 were non-math majors (e.g., psychology, child and family studies,
communications, etc.) recruited from upper-level psychology courses. The breakdown of
religious identification in decreasing percentage was as follows: Christian (41.3%), Protestant
Christian (18.3%), Agnostic (15.6%), Catholic Christian (10.1%), No Religion (6.4%), Atheist
(3.7%), Other (3.7%), and Jewish (0.9%). Participation was voluntary and some students
(psychology majors) received course credit for participating. This research was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (Appendix A).
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Materials

Demographics
Data were collected on age, gender, current major, academic classification, and current
purported GPA of each student (Appendix B).

Religious Beliefs
The religious beliefs of the participants were measured through multiple means
(Appendix C). The first series of questions was an 8-item scale that assessed participants’
conventional beliefs in religious/supernatural entities, including heaven, hell, miracles, afterlife,
angels, demons, soul, and the devil/Satan (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang,
2014a; Pennycook et al., 2016b). Participants indicated their level of belief in each
religious/supernatural entity by responding to a 5-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree to
strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher religious belief. The estimate of internal
reliability for this scale from this sample was excellent ( = .942). The next question asked the
participant to identify what type of God, if any, they believed in. Those who indicated they
believed in 1) A personal God, 2) God as an impersonal force, or 3) A God who created
everything but does not intervene in human affairs were coded as theists. Those who indicated
they 4) Don’t know whether or not any Gods exist, or 5) Don’t know whether or not any Gods
exist and no one else does either were coded as agnostics. Those who selected the options 6) I
don’t believe in Gods of any sort, or 7) I believe that God does not exist were coded as atheists.
Finally, participants were given a question where they indicated what religion, if any, they
subscribed to.
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Numeracy
To measure numeracy, an abridged version of the Mathematical Prerequisites for
Psychometrics (PMP) was crafted and administered. The PMP was originally created to measure
student mathematical ability across six domains: Operations, Fractions, Set theory, first order
Equations, Relations, and Probability (Galli et al., 2008). It shows good construct validity with
positive attitudes towards statistics, r = .41, p < .01, and good predictive validity with failure and
non-failure of exams, t(305) = 7.45, p < .001. The estimate of internal reliability of this scale
from this sample was acceptable ( = .788).
This questionnaire was chosen as a measure of numeracy, because it requires participants
to have prerequisite knowledge of statistical operations at a level that most non-math majors can
understand (Galli, Chiesi, & Primi, 2011). Therefore, success on this measure was accessible to
all students in the sample. In order to craft the abridged version of the PMP, for the purpose of
reducing participant fatigue, the 30 original PMP items were sorted into two 15 item pools of
equal difficulty. One of the pools was selected at random to be used in this pilot study (Appendix
D).

Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning
This task consists of eight syllogistic reasoning problems, derived from the work of
Markovits and Nantel (1989), that have been used to evaluate non-numerical, logical reasoning
(Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). Participants were asked to assume the premises of each
syllogism were true and assess whether or not the conclusions followed logically from the
premises (Appendix E). In order to answer them correctly, however, they had to set aside their
prior knowledge and make conclusions from new, counterintuitive premises. For example, one
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item reads, “Premise 1: All things that are smoked are good for the health; Premise 2: Cigarettes
are smoked; Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health.” The correct answer is that this
syllogism is valid, but because most people hold the belief that smoking is bad for the health,
their belief bias may lead them to (incorrectly) conclude that this syllogism is invalid. The other
seven items also have conclusions inconsistent with their validity structures. As such, this task
measures cognitive processing akin to dual-process theory, though unlike the CRT, it does not
require mathematical skill to solve correctly. Responses to this task are dichotomous, and scores
are calculated as sum totals of correct answers. Possible scores range from 0-8 with higher scores
indicating greater cognitive reflection.
The task has received poor estimates of internal reliability in other studies (Chronbach’s
 = 0.64; Toplak et al., 2014), but in the current sample, the estimate was higher ( = .786). It
has also been used as a predictive measure of religious belief, just like the CRT (Pennycook et
al., 2013).

CRT (Original)
The CRT is a measure of cognitive reflection, given that it measures respondents’
propensity to override their intuitions on a series of mathematics questions and reach an
analytical answer (Frederick, 2005). It consists of three questions, each of which has an intuitive,
incorrect answer and an analytical, correct answer (Appendix F). Estimates of the internal
reliability of the CRT have been low-to-adequate (’s between 0.60 and 0.74) (Liberali et al.,
2012; Stieger & Reips, 2016), though for this sample, the estimate was stronger ( = .797).
Participants were not allowed to use calculators, but they could spend as much time as they
wanted on these questions. Scores on this measure range from 0-3, with each number
51

representing how many questions each participant got correct. High scores indicate strong
analytical cognitive style.

CRT (Additional)
This measure contains 4 items that are similar in design to the original CRT questions
(Appendix G), because they each have an intuitive and an analytical answer, but they are useful
in this research in that they are not as well-known as the original three and thus are not prey to
carryover effects (Toplak et al., 2014). Scores on this measure range from 0-4, with each number
representing how many questions each participant got correct. As before, high scores indicate
stronger analytical cognitive style. The CRT (additional) correlates fairly well with the CRT
(original) (r = .55+; Pennycook et al., 2016b). The correlation between the two scales reached
this range in the current sample (r = .645, p < .001). Estimates of internal consistency for the two
CRT’s combined is slightly higher than the original CRT alone as well ( = 0.72; Toplak et al.,
2014); the estimate from the current sample was similar in magnitude ( = .793). For the sake of
time and participant fatigue, the last item of the CRT (additional) was removed from all surveys
in Study 1, but it returned in Study 2.

Procedures
Participants were given hard copies of the battery of questionnaires in mixed order. Most
surveys were administered in large classroom settings, but for the sake of recruiting math majors,
some were administered in more casual, “student lounge” settings. Participants were instructed to
go through the packet and answer the questions accurately, honestly, and with no calculators.
The average time that students needed to complete the survey was 15-25 minutes.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 1 RESULTS

Descriptive statistics for the variables and a correlation matrix of the cognitive tasks can
be found in Table 1 and Table 2 below. Participants in this sample responded quite highly to the
religious beliefs questionnaire (M = 3.68, SD = 1.060), reflecting the nearly 75% belief in a God
or higher power reported earlier. Participants also excelled at the numeracy task. The reverse was
true of the CRT items, all of which showed high positive skewness. Therefore, ceiling and
flooring effects could have partially reduced the efficacy of the results of the statistic tests
described in the next sections. The responses to the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning task and
the measurement of analytic cognitive style (ACS), which was the sum total of the original CRT
items, the additional CRT items, and the syllogism task, were much more normally-distributed.
Finally, all the cognitive tasks were significantly and positively related to teach other, as
expected.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Study 1

Religious Beliefs
Numeracy
CRT (original)
CRT (additional)
CRT Total (w/o recognition)
CRT Total
Syllogisms
ACS

N Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
110
1
5
3.68 1.060
-0.696
-0.289
110
3
15 11.45 2.970
-0.680
-0.172
110
0
3
0.98 1.125
0.745
-0.894
110
0
3
0.97 1.036
0.762
-0.604
67
0
6
1.48 1.761
1.256
0.765
110
0
6
1.96 1.958
0.866
-0.393
110
0
8
4.70 2.337
-0.293
-0.874
110
0
14
6.66 3.801
0.295
-0.761
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Correlation Matrix of Cognitive Tasks in Study 1 (all p’s < .001)

Table 2

CRT (original) CRT (additional) Numeracy Syllogisms
CRT (original)
1
CRT (additional)
.645
1
Numeracy
.565
.550
1
Syllogisms
.525
.489
.558
1

Hypothesis 1
Overall performance on the original CRT negatively correlated with religious belief (r = .210, p = .028; see Table 3). Another measure of cognitive reflection, the belief bias syllogisms,
negatively correlated with religious belief (r = -.265, p = .005). ACS showed a similar negative
relationship with religious belief (r = -.232, p = .015). Numeracy did not significantly correlate
to religious belief (r = -.039, p = .683). Unexpectedly, these were the only relationships that
coincided with the Pennycook et al. (2016b) study. The additional CRT questions did not
correlate significantly with religious belief (r = -.021, p = .824), nor did performance on all the
CRT items, whether calculated with those who were familiar with at least one of the items (r = .134, p = .162) or without them (r = -.116, p = .352, N = 67). The correlations of the non-math
majors from the upper-level psychology courses fell in line with the expected trend, but the
correlations of the math majors showed atypical variations. These anomalies will be discussed in
the next chapter.
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Table 3

Correlations (r) Between Religious Belief and Performance on Cognitive Tasks in
Study 1

Non-Math
Majors(82)
Math
Majors(28)
Combined(110)

CRT1

CRT2

CRT3

CRT
Total

Syllogisms

ACS

Numeracy

-.309**

-.049

-.182(54)

-.226*

-.273*

-.298**

-.090

-.078

.051

-.180(13)

-.017

-.299

-.173

.332

-.210*

-.021

-.116(67)

-.134

-.265**

-.232*

-.039

In Table 3, CRT1 = Accuracy on original 3-item CRT; CRT2 = Accuracy on additional
CRT problems; CRT3 = Accuracy on all 6 CRT problems excluding participants who indicated
seeing at least one of the problems; CRT Total = Accuracy on all 6 CRT items; and ACS =
Analytic Cognitive Style (addition of CRT Total and Syllogisms). N listed in parentheses. *
indicates p < .05 and ** indicates p < .01
A series of one-way ANOVA’s were conducted to determine which of the three theistic
groups, theist, agnostic, or atheist, performed best on the cognitive tasks. When ACS was
inputted as the dependent variable, there was a statistical difference between the three groups,
F(2, 107) = 4.260, p = .017, ƞ2 = .074 (Figure 6). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed that
agnostics (M = 8.57, SD = 3.488) scored significantly higher than theists (M = 6.07, SD = 3.800,
p = .014), though atheists (M = 7.60, SD = 2.302) did not score significantly higher than theists
(p = .643) or agnostics (p = .857). There were only two other cognitive tasks for which this trend
continued: the original CRT (F = 5.694, p = .004) and the syllogisms (F = 4.941, p = .009).
Analyses of all other models of performance on the remaining cognitive tasks, including those
that excluded participants who had seen the CRT items before, revealed no statistically
significant differences between the three groups (F’s < 2.423, p’s > .097).
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Figure 6

Mean accuracy on analytic cognitive style (ACS) as a function of theism in Study
1 (N’s = 82, 23, and 5, respectively)

Religious belief was regressed onto ACS, numeracy, self-reported GPA, age, and gender.
This multiple regression model was statistically significant, F(5, 101) = 2.662, p = .027, and
ACS emerged as a significant predictor of religious belief ( = -0.116, p = .002, 95% CI [-.188, .044]), whereas numeracy ( = 0.073, p = .133, 95% CI [-.022, .168]), gender ( = -0.266, p =
.267, 95% CI [-.739, .207]), age ( = -0.002, p = .906, 95% CI [-.035, .031]), and self-reported
GPA ( = 0.281, p = .272, 95% CI [-.224, .786]) did not. This evidence indicates that analytic
cognitive style is a powerful and unique predictor of religious beliefs.

Hypothesis 2
According to an independent-samples t-test, math majors (M = 1.93, SD = 1.215)
significantly outperformed non-math majors (M = 0.66, SD = 0.892) on the CRT (original),
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t(108) = 5.904, p < .001 (Figure 7). In a statistically significant multiple regression model, F(4,
102) = 19.369, p < .001), math majors still performed better than non-math majors on the CRT
(original) ( = 0.492, p = .038, 95% CI [.029, .956]), even when controlling for numerical ability
( = 0.118, p = .003, 95% CI [.040, .196]), GPA ( = 0.145, p = .485, 95% CI [-.266, .557]), and
performance on the syllogisms task ( = 0.135, p = .003, 95% CI [.048, .222]).

Figure 7

Mean accuracy on CRT (original) as a function of major (N’s = 82 and 28,
respectively)
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CHAPTER V
STUDY 1 DISCUSSION AND RATIONALE FOR STUDY 2

The purpose of Study 1 was to replicate the results of prior research on the relationship
between analytical thinking and religiosity and to demonstrate that upper-level math majors
would outperform upper-level non-math majors on a reasoning task that required math skills to
solve successful. To this end, this initial study was a success. In support of Hypothesis 1a,
measures of cognitive reflection, such as the original CRT and the belief bias in syllogistic
reasoning task, negatively correlated with religious belief. Overall ACS, which was a sum total
of three measures of cognitive reflection, also negatively correlated with religious belief (r = .232). This result coincided neatly with the expected magnitudes of this relationship (r’s between
-.18 and -.33; Pennycook et al., 2016b). There were a couple of oddities that deserve explanation,
however. For one, not all measures of cognitive reflection (e.g., the additional CRT) were
significantly negatively related to religious belief, despite research suggesting that they should
have been. This inconsistency could be explained by low sample size and power. Second, there
could have been something about the math majors that enabled them able to accept supernatural
religious claims and still think reflectively about math, thereby making it so that there was no
relationship between their analytic cognitive styles and their religious beliefs. The explanation
for such a puzzle lies beyond the scope of this current investigation, but it remains plausible that
math students are fundamentally different than psychology students in how they think about
religion and math.
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In partial support of Hypothesis 1b, agnostics outperformed theists on some of the key
measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., the original CRT, the syllogisms, and ACS). Atheists,
however, did not do better than theists and agnostics on any of the measures. Previous evidence
has shown that agnostics do better than theists and atheists do better than both groups
(Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2016b), but the overarching trend, which has shown
up consistently in this study, is that disbelievers do better than believers. In other words, even
though those in the “most extreme category” of disbelief (i.e., atheists) did not do substantially
better than theists or agnostics, a larger representation of disbelievers (i.e., agnostics) still did.
This outcome raises an interesting question: what if the relationship between religiosity and
cognitive reflection were truly curvilinear? That is, maybe those who too readily accept or
outright reject religious beliefs are the most intuitive thinkers, whereas those who exercise more
caution with respect to both extreme positions (i.e., agnostics) think the most reflectively.
Hypothesis 1c was supported with a multiple regression model, showing that ACS is a
significant predictor of religious belief, even when controlling for numerical ability, gender, age,
and GPA. This finding also coincides with past research, where various other controls (such as
intelligence, education, and socioeconomic status) have been included in other regression models
to ensure that ACS is the best predictor of religious beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2013; Pennycook
et al., 2016b; Shenhav et al., 2012).
Finally, Hypothesis 2 was supported with an independent samples t-test, which showed
that upper-level math students considerably outperformed upper-level psychology students on
the original CRT. This finding is critical, because it demonstrates that one’s familiarity with a
specific domain of expertise or experience (i.e., math) significantly increases one’s ability to
solve reasoning tasks related to that domain. The CRT is a math-based test of cognitive reflection
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(Frederick, 2005). Despite the fact that the calculations required to solve the CRT questions,
especially the ball-and-bat problem, are rudimentary (De Neys et al., 2013; Mastrogiorgio &
Petracca, 2014), the format of the questions appeals mainly to those who normally use math to
solve real world problems (Mastrogiorgio, 2015).
The upper-level psychology and math students should have been equally fooled by the
CRT, at least according to prior evidence suggesting that most students from top-level
universities, like Princeton University and Carnegie Mellon University, make at least one
mistake on the CRT (Frederick, 2005). However, based off of the evidence in this current study,
only certain types of students get fooled by the CRT. Namely, they are students who do not come
from robust math-based backgrounds (as is the case for most psychology students in their final
years of undergraduate education). Such a finding makes sense. Psychology students spend time
learning the intricacies of personality theory, how to write in proper APA format, and how
traumas to different lobes of the brain affect behavior. Their education is primary qualitative and
experience-based. Math students, by contrast, are trained to solve complex calculus problems
and reason through differential equations. Their education is quantitative and based in abstract
logic. If, instead of solving math- and logic-based problems, the math students were given
cognitive reflection problems relating to psychology, the paradigm could theoretically be
reversed. The upper-level psychology students, who would have spent their education reasoning
through theories of psychology, would not be so fooled by these hypothetical “Psych CRT”
problems; instead, they would outperform the math students.
If the evidence of Study 1 shows anything at all, it shows that the traps set by the current
measures of cognitive reflection are only ensnaring insofar as they are placed before
inexperienced thinkers. An experienced mathematician does not fall prey to his or her intuitions
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when thinking through an intentionally tricky math problem. An experienced psychologist who
is inexperienced in math, however, does. The same could be true for any number of domains of
reasoning. An experienced car mechanic does not hear the rattling sound of a lawn mower motor
and mistake it for the roar of a car engine; however, an experienced businessman who is
inexperienced in car mechanics might. A mother familiar with the wailings of her child might be
able to consistently distinguish between a cry for food and a cry for attention; however, an
experienced chess player unfamiliar in child rearing might not. Nobody would make the
argument that these individuals who would fall for the “intuitive traps” in the previous examples
would be cognitively handicapped, yet if these “measures” of cognitive reflection were used to
assess analytic thinking in general, surely everyone who was not a mathematician, a car
mechanic, or a babysitter would be labeled as relatively poor thinkers.
How well people appear to reason depends entirely on what they are asked to reason
about. This argument is the prevailing motivation for Study 2. In Study 1, religious individuals
were shown to be relatively poor thinkers compared to their nonreligious counterparts. However,
this claim is based solely on their performance on just a few, very specific tasks of cognitive
reflection. If the logic of the above paragraph is even remotely true, then surely religious
individuals are not completely incapable of thinking reflectively! Instead, they just appear to not
think reflectively within the domains of math-based and general-logic-based reasoning. If given
the opportunity, however, they may reason quite well within a domain in which they have
intimate familiarity and experience: religion. If there were a measure of cognitive reflection that
tapped into the unique experiences of religious individuals, then on that measure, religious
individuals would outperform nonreligious individuals.
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Religion Reflection Scale
In an attempt to arouse analytical thinking among religious individuals, the Religion
Reflection Scale (RSS) was created (Appendix J). The RRS is unique in that it incorporates the
same dual-process thinking of other measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., its items have intuitive
traps that must be overridden to solve correctly), but it does so with content that is unique to the
experiences and beliefs of religious individuals. Take, for instance, the following syllogism:

Premise 1: All nonphysical beings do not exist
Premise 2: God is a nonphysical being
Conclusion: God does not exist

Presumably, a religious individual who believed that God existed would find immediate conflict
between this belief and the conclusion presented here. Such an individual would feel an intuitive
pull to assume that the internal logic of the syllogism, or its validity, was flawed, since its
conclusion would intuitively be “untrue”. However, an individual with greater cognitive
reflection capabilities would be able to mentally process the syllogism with greater reflection and
(correctly) realize that the conclusion follows logically from the premises (provided one was, of
course, asked to assume the premises were true for the sake of the exercise). As such, the RRS
measures cognitive reflection within the context of religion.
Belief in God was not the only realm of religious belief or experience that was
represented in the RRS. Other religious-based domains in the current, predominantly Christian,
zeitgeist were incorporated, including beliefs in the creation of the world, the inerrancy of the
Bible, the divinity of Jesus, and the common practice of prayer among religious believers. These
themes were selected based off of their relevance among believers in Christian traditions (Hood
et al., 2009), informal conversations with religious believers, the input of an expert in religious
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studies (Dr. Ralph Hood), and the input of an expert in dual-process theory and religion (Dr.
Gordon Pennycook).
As one will immediately notice, the RRS is reminiscent of the belief bias in syllogistic
reasoning task (Study 1 and Markovits & Nantel, 1989). This use was intentional, as the
syllogistic reasoning task has already been used to assess reasoning across different domains. For
example, Markovits and Nantel (1989) discovered that changing the content of the syllogisms
from abstract to meaningful changed performance. That is, when the syllogisms were presented
with nonsensical terms, participants were more likely to separate themselves from their intuitions
and correctly identify whether or not the syllogisms were sound; alternatively, when the exact
same structured syllogisms were presented with meaningful terms, participants made more
intuitive errors. An example follows.

Premise 1: All things that are smoked are good for the health
Premise 2: Cigarettes are smoked
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health
Markovits and Nantel (1989) found that, when the meaningful term “Cigarettes” was replaced by
the nonsensical term “Ramadion”, participants made less errors. This phenomenon, to repeat
again, is known as belief bias. It is the tendency for one to erroneously judge the strength of an
argument based on the believability of its conclusion rather than its merits (Evans, Newstead, &
Byrne, 1993). The issue of belief bias will be addressed in the following paragraph, but the
takeaway here is that the syllogistic reasoning task offers a unique opportunity for researchers to
change the stimulus, or the content, of the items to suit their needs. In the past, the items have
been changed from abstract to meaningful; presumably, they can also change to reflect different
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areas of knowledge, like religion. The RRS is based off of the syllogistic reasoning task for this
reason.
As was argued in regards to the content effect, there is a tendency for participant’s
familiarity with the content of a reasoning task to instead positively influence their performance
(Cox & Griggs, 1982). So, too, can the content of syllogistic reasoning tasks affect performance
and even attenuate belief bias. For instance, Goel and Vartanian (2011) found that when
participants were given meaningful syllogisms with neutral conclusions, they fell prey to belief
bias, but when they were given the same types of syllogisms with inflammatory conclusions,
they made less errors. This evidence suggests that the more provocative a syllogism is, the less
likely participants go with their guts when judging its conclusion. Given the prevalence and
meaningfulness of religions in society (Gallup, 2017), surely one of the most provocative things
one could do is present ideas that run contrary to deeply held religious beliefs. This is the point
of the RRS: to evoke Type 2 reasoning among religious believers by provoking or challenging
their religious-based intuitions.

Rationale for Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to extend the logic established in Study 1. In Study 1, math
students far outscored psychology students in the math-based CRT, even when controlling for
academic performance, numerical ability, and performance on the logic-based syllogistic
reasoning task. This evidence suggests that there is something unique about the experiences and
education of the math students that enables them to do better on the CRT than psychology
students. The goal of Study 2 is to likewise show that religious individuals are reflective
thinkers, though they have not been given the unique opportunity to show their prowess in a
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domain that is familiar to them. Just as math would be familiar to math students, religion would
be familiar to religious individuals. When given a chance to reason about religious concepts,
religious individuals should do better than nonreligious individuals. The RRS acts as a means of
tapping into the reflective powers of religious individuals, specifically in regards to their domain
of familiarity: religion.

Study 2 Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a: The CRT will negatively correlate with religious belief.
Hypothesis 1b: Measures of ACS will negatively correlate with religious belief.
Hypothesis 1c: ACS will predict religious belief, even when controlling for numeracy,
gender, and reported GPA
Hypothesis 3a: Religious belief will positively correlate with religious reflection.
Hypothesis 3b: Religious familiarity will positively and uniquely predict religious
reflection.
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CHAPTER VI
STUDY 2 METHOD

Participants
Data were collected from 185 participants (80% female) between November 2017 and
February 2018 in classroom and lab settings at UTC. Of the 21 participants who had any missing
data (~11% of total), only five failed to answer more than two questions. To accommodate for
this missing data, cases were deleted listwise in individual analyses (but not excluded from the
dataset entirely). The average age was 21.14 years (SD = 4.139) and the average reported GPA
was 3.29 (SD = 0.483) out of a possible 4.0. There were 32 freshmen (17%), 48 sophomores
(26%), 59 juniors (32%), 39 seniors (21%), and six graduate students (3%). Most students
identified as having a belief in a personal God or higher power (i.e., theist; 79%). The breakdown
of religious identification in decreasing percentage was as follows: Christian (48.6%), Agnostic
(13.5%), Protestant Christian (9.7%), Catholic Christian (9.7%), No religion (8.6%), Other
(4.3%), Atheist (1.6%), Muslim (1.1%), Buddhist (0.5%), Hindu (0.5%), and Muslim (0.5%).
Participation was voluntary and all students received course credit for participating. This
research was approved by the Institutional Review Board of UTC (Appendix A).

Procedures
The procedures for Study 2 largely mimicked those of Study 1. Participants gave
informed consent to participate and then took the battery of questionnaires in a mixed order so
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that there was counterbalancing of the measures (Finley, Tang, & Schmeichel, 2015). They
completed the battery on paper in either a laboratory room or a classroom and were instructed to
write in or circle only one answer per item and not use calculators. They were given as much
time as they needed to complete the questionnaires, though most took between 15-30 minutes on
average.

Materials

Demographics
The same demographic information that was collected for Study 1 was again collected for
Study 2 (Appendix B).

Religious Beliefs
The same measure from Study 1 was also used for Study 2 (Appendix C). The estimate of
internal reliability for the 8-item scale assessing beliefs in supernatural religious concepts was
excellent for this study as well ( = .901).

Numeracy
The same measure from Study 1, the half-PMP (Galli et al., 2011), was also used for
Study 2 (Appendix D). The estimate of internal reliability for this scale in this sample was
acceptable ( = .758).
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Religious Familiarity
At the end of the religious beliefs questionnaire, there was a brief section where the
participants reported their personal familiarity with religious concepts (Appendix H). These three
questions came from the intellect dimension of the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS; Huber
& Huber, 2012). Participants indicated their level of cognitive interest or involvement in
religious topics by selecting one of the five Likert-style response options. Scores for this measure
can range from 1 to 5 with high scores representing higher familiarity or interest in religious
topics (regardless of religious belief itself). The CRS has high internal consistency across its five
dimensions (’s = .80 - .93) and high construct validity with respect to religious identity in a
students’ sample (r = .83) and in the international Religious Monitor (r = .73; for overview, see
Huber & Huber, 2012). The three items of the religious familiarity subscale of the CRS showed
good internal reliability in this sample ( = .805).

Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning (Updated Version)
This task was used as a measure of non-numerical, logic-based cognitive reflection
(Appendix I). It differs from the original Syllogistic Reasoning measure (Appendix E) in two
marked ways: one, the items coincide with modern terms (e.g., Rockefeller was replaced by Bill
Gates), and two, half of the items were replaced with alternative items whose internal validity
structures were consistent with the believability of their conclusions (i.e., participants now could
not get all eight items correct by simply guessing the “non-intuitive” responses). These changes
were implemented to reduce participant confusion with outdated terms and disrupted their
pattern recognition. This technique of altering the content and structure of the belief bias
syllogisms has theoretical and practical precedence in the literature (Morley, Evans, & Handley,
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2004; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2017). Surprisingly, the
estimate of internal reliability for this scale in this study was incredibly low ( = .378), despite
indications that it measures similar constructs to the other cognitive measures (Table 5).

CRT (Original)
The CRT was used again as a measure of math-based cognitive reflection (Appendix F).
The estimate of reliability for measure in this sample was lower than for Study 1 ( = .631).

CRT (Additional)
The same additional CRT items were included in this study (Appendix G), though this
time, all four items were included instead of just the first three. The estimate of reliability of this
measure for this study was incredibly poor ( = .401).

Religion Reflection Scale
This eight-item measure consists of religious-based syllogisms, and as such, it was
intended to measure cognitive reflection within the domain of religion (Appendix J). The
structure of the RRS is similar to that of the updated belief bias in syllogistic reasoning task. Half
of the syllogisms are valid, whereas the other half are invalid. Of the valid syllogisms, half have
conclusions that are believable to a religious individual (consistent items) and half have
conclusions that are not believable (inconsistent items). Of the invalid syllogisms, half have
conclusions that are believable to a religious individual (inconsistent items) and half have
conclusions that are not believable (consistent items). Answers are coded dichotomously as
correct or incorrect. Scores range from 0-8 with higher scores indicating higher religious
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cognitive reflection. The measure of internal reliability for this scale, in line with the estimate of
reliability for the updated general syllogisms, was poor ( = .398).
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CHAPTER VII
STUDY 2 RESULTS

Descriptive statistics for the variables and a correlation matrix of the cognitive tasks can
be found in Table 4 and Table 5 below. There were no marked differences between participants
in the two studies in terms of descriptive statistics. Participants in this sample responded just as
highly to the supernatural religious beliefs questionnaire as did those in Study 1 (M = 3.74, SD =
0.874), adding to the potential for ceiling effects. Responses to the CRT questionnaires were also
highly positively skewed, adding to the potential for floor effects. The measure with the highest
degree of normality, in terms of shape, was the new religious familiarity questionnaire (M =
3.22, SD = 0.891, skewness = 0.134). This finding indicates that religious familiarity and
religious beliefs are two different constructs, despite their statistical relatedness (r = .271, p <
.001). Interestingly, the distributions of the responses to the general syllogisms, the RRS, and
ACS (which, in this case, was the addition of all three original CRT items, all four additional
CRT items, and both 8-item syllogistic reasoning tasks) were more positively skewed than those
in Study 1. Granted, all three of these measures were not the same as those in Study 1, but this
finding is still noteworthy. Finally, all the cognitive tasks were significantly and positively
related to each other, as expected (though to a lesser magnitude than Study 1).

71

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Study 2

N Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Religious Beliefs
184
1
5
3.74 0.874
-0.812
0.556
Religious Familiarity 183 1.33
5
3.22 0.891
0.134
-0.720
Numeracy
185
2
15
9.77 3.171
-0.284
-0.839
CRT (original)
183
0
3
0.50 0.851
1.588
1.463
CRT (additional)
183
0
4
0.75 0.921
1.204
1.027
CRT Total (w/o recog.) 136
0
6
0.93 1.162
1.538
2.579
CRT Total
183
0
7
1.25 1.501
1.436
1.786
General Syllogisms
185
2
8
4.75 1.416
0.923
0.102
RRS
185
1
8
4.01 1.546
0.445
-0.085
ACS
185
5
22
9.99 3.549
1.178
1.030

Table 5

Correlation Matrix of Cognitive Tasks in Study 2 (all p’s < .001)

CRT (original)
CRT (additional)
Numeracy
General
Syllogisms
RRS

CRT
(original)
1
.443
.486

CRT
(additional)
1
.358

1

.320

.323

.418

1

.336

.329

.419

.589

Numeracy

General
Syllogisms

RRS

1

For the sake of consistency between Study 1 and Study 2, all eight items of both the
general syllogisms and the RRS were included in the analysis of the following hypotheses.
However, it is worth noting that there were mean differences in subtotal scores between the
consistent and inconsistent syllogisms. Collectively, participants scored higher on the consistent
general (M = 3.39, SD = 0.72) and religious (M = 2.64, SD = 0.87) syllogisms than the
inconsistent general (M = 1.36, SD = 1.25) and religious (M = 1.37, SD = 1.19) syllogisms,
indicating that when the syllogisms were constructed with logic that was consistent with the
believability of their conclusions, people answered them more correctly. Likewise, when they
were inconsistent with the believability of their conclusions, as was the case with the eight
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original syllogisms in Study 1, people tended to answer them incorrectly. This trend remained
when the scores of only believers (theists) were analyzed; however, nonbelievers (agnostics and
atheists) deviated from this trend a little bit in that they scored about as high on the consistent
religious syllogisms (M = 2.46, SD = 0.96) as they did on the inconsistent syllogisms (M = 2.32,
SD = 1.18). Statistically, though, nonbelievers did not do any better than believers with respect to
the consistent religious syllogisms, t(181) = 1.37, p = .174. It was only with respect to the
inconsistent religious syllogisms that nonbelievers did better than their believing counterparts (M
= 1.14, SD = 1.07), t(181) = 5.87, p < .001. These moderating differences in performance on the
RRS between believers and nonbelievers suggest that the two groups are equally adept at
answering the consistent religious syllogisms, but nonbelievers get an edge when answering the
reflection-requiring inconsistent religious syllogisms. This finding is inconsistent with
Hypothesis 3 (as will be described later), but is potentially consistent with the notion that
religious familiarity plays a stronger role than religious affiliation in predicting performance on
the RRS (as will also be described later).

Hypothesis 1
Performance on the original CRT negatively correlated with religious belief for Study 2
(r = -.203, p = .006) and both studies combined (r = -.208, p < .001; see Table 6). The additional
CRT items also negatively correlated with religious belief, even when those who were familiar
with at least one of the items were removed (r = -.181, p = .035, N = 136). Both of these
relationships became nonsignificant in the combined analysis, though. The general belief bias
syllogisms correlated negatively with religious beliefs in the first study when presented with only
inconsistent conclusions (r = -.265, p = .005), but in Study 2, the relationship became
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nonsignificant (r = -.088, p = .236). In the combined analysis, this relationship was also
significant (r = -.182, p = .002). As will be repeated later, the RRS did not positively correlate
with religious belief; instead, it significantly negatively correlated to religious belief (r = -.149, p
= .043), just like most of the other measures of cognitive reflection. All measures of ACS,
whether from just the six CRT items and the inconsistent syllogisms (Study 1; r = -.232, p =
.015) or from the seven CRT items, the consistent and inconsistent general syllogisms, and the
RRS (Study 2; r = -.189, p = .010), were significant. The combined model showed the same
relationship (r = -.212, p < .001). Numeracy showed significance in Study 2 (r = -.205, p = .005),
which brought the combined relationship to significance as well (r = -.140, p = .016).

Table 6

Correlations (r) Between Religious Belief and Performance on Cognitive Tasks
Across Study 1 and Study 2
CRT1

CRT2

CRT3

CRT Total

General
Syllogisms

RRS

ACS

Numeracy

Study 1(110)

-.210*

-.021

-.116(67)

-.134

-.265**

-

-.232*

-.039

Study 2(184)

-.203**(182)

-.154*(182)

-.181*(136)

-.209**(182)

-.088

-.149*

-.189**

-.205**

Combined(294)

-.208**

-.090

-.131(203)

-.172**

-.182**

-.149*(184)

-.212**

-.140*

In Table 6, CRT1 = Accuracy on original 3-item CRT; CRT2 = Proportionate accuracy on
additional CRT problems; CRT3 = Proportionate accuracy on all 6 or 7 CRT problems excluding
participants who indicated seeing at least one of the problems; CRT Total = Proportionate
accuracy on all 6 or 7 CRT problems; General Syllogisms = Accuracy on either original or
updated belief bias in syllogistic reasoning task; RRS = Religion Reflection Scale; ACS =
Analytic Cognitive Style (proportionate addition of CRT Total, General Syllogisms, and RRS,
where appropriate). * indicates p < .05 and ** indicates p < .01
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A series of one-way ANOVA’s were conducted to determine which of the three theistic
groups, theist, agnostic, or atheist, performed best on the cognitive tasks. When ACS was
inputted as the dependent variable, there was a statistical difference between the three groups in
Study 2, F(2, 180) = 7.395, p = .001, ƞ2 = .076 (Figure 8). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed
that agnostics (M = 11.97, SD = 4.151) significantly outscored theists (M = 9.51, SD = 3.158, p =
.001), whereas atheists (M = 11.83, SD = 5.913) did not outscore neither agnostics nor theists
(p’s = .996 and .240, respectively). With the following cognitive tasks as dependent variables,
only agnostics outscored theists: numeracy (F = 4.324, p = .015), the total CRT excluding those
who had seen at least one of the items (F = 3.873, p = .023), the general syllogisms (F = 4.755, p
= .010), and the RRS (F = 6.311, p = .002). With two measures, the additional CRT items (F =
4.211, p = .016) and total CRT (F = 4.677, p = .010), only atheists outscored theists. The only
model where there were no significant differences between the three groups was with the original
CRT (F = 2.518, p = .083). All the others indicated that either atheists or agnostics did better
than theists.
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Figure 8

Mean accuracy on analytic cognitive style (ACS) as a function of theism in Study
2 (N’s = 146, 31, and 6, respectively)

For both studies combined, there was also a significant difference between the three
theistic groups when proportionate ACS performance was inputted as the dependent variable,
F(2, 290) = 11.316, p < .001, ƞ2 = .072 (Figure 9). A post-hoc Tukey HSD analysis revealed a
consistent finding: agnostics (M = 0.560, SD = 0.215) outscored theists only (M = 0.421, SD =
0.013, p < .001), whereas atheists (M = 0.527, SD = 0.210) neither outscored agnostics (p = .880)
nor theists (p = .197). This trend continued for numeracy (F = 5.175, p = .006), the original CRT
(F = 7.896, p < .001), proportionate accuracies on all CRT items (F = 5.486, p = .005),
proportionate accuracies on all CRT items when people familiar with them were removed (F =
3.228, p = .042, though no significant differences were found in post-hoc analysis) and the
general belief bias syllogisms tasks (F = 9.541, p < .001). The only model that was
nonsignificant was the one with only the additional CRT items (F = 1.603, p = .203).
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Collectively, this evidence indicates that nonbelievers performed better than theists on multiple
measures of cognitive reflection.

Figure 9

Mean proportional accuracy on analytic cognitive style (ACS) as a function of
theism for both studies combined (N’s = 228, 54, and 11, respectively)

Religious belief was regressed onto ACS, numeracy, self-reported GPA, age, and gender.
This model was non-significant, F(5, 167) = 1.830, p = .110. When the studies were combined,
though, a stronger pattern emerged. In a multiple regression model with the same controls, F(5,
274) = 3.849, p = .002, ACS emerged as the only significant predictor of religious belief ( = 1.069, p = .002, 95% CI [-1.750, -.389]; all other p’s > .2). Collectively, this evidence indicates
that analytic cognitive style is a powerful and unique predictor of religious belief.

77

Hypothesis 3
The RRS was moderately and significantly related to the other measures of cognitive
reflection (Table 5), providing some construct validation that it was, at least to some extent,
measuring cognitive reflection. The lack of multicollinearity with these scales indicates,
however, that the RRS was also measuring some other construct. This other construct was not
religious belief, as indicated by the negative relationship between the RRS and religious belief (r
= -.149, p = .043; see Table 6).
Religious familiarity positively and significantly correlated with RRS performance (r =
.151, p = .041, Table 7), suggesting that the RRS was drawing out more of a cognitive reflection
component of religiosity than simply a belief-based one. The religious familiarity questionnaire
was also not simply a measure of a need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), as such a
measure of self-reported willingness to think should have correlated positively with all the
measures of cognitive reflection, not just the religious-based one. However, when controlling for
religious beliefs ( = -0.145, p = .189), numeracy ( = 0.064, p = .067), performance on all seven
CRT items ( = 0.143, p = .047), and performance on the general syllogisms ( = 0.502, p <
.001), religious familiarity did not come out as a unique predictor of RRS performance ( =
0.189, p = .077), F(5, 175) = 24.599, p < .001.

Table 7
Religious
Beliefs
.271**

Correlations (r) Between Religious Familiarity and Other Measures of Cognition
CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
.002

.032

.132

CRT
Total
.023
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General
Syllogisms
.132

RRS

Numeracy

.151*

.038

In Table 7, CRT1 = Accuracy on original 3-item CRT; CRT2 = Accuracy on additional
CRT problems; CRT3 = Accuracy on all 7 CRT problems excluding participants who indicated
seeing at least one of the problems; CRT Total = Accuracy on all 7 CRT problems; General
Syllogisms = Accuracy on updated belief bias in syllogistic reasoning task; RRS = Religion
Reflection Scale. * indicates p < .05 and ** indicates p < .01
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CHAPTER VIII
STUDY 2 DISCUSSION

The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the results of prior research on the relationship
between analytical thinking and religiosity and to demonstrate that a novel measure of cognitive
reflection, the Religion Reflection Scale, would instead positively correlate with religious belief.
To this end, this study was only partially successful. In support of Hypothesis 1, all of the classic
measures of cognitive reflection, including the original CRT items, the additional CRT items,
and the “new” general syllogisms task, negatively correlated with religious belief. Overall ACS,
which was a sum total of the CRT items, the general syllogisms, and the RRS, was negatively
correlated with religious belief. This relationship manifested across both studies (r = -.212),
which coincides with expectations (r’s between -.18 and -.33; Pennycook et al., 2016b). Mean
comparisons indicated that nonbelievers (i.e., agnostics and atheists) outperformed believers (i.e.,
theists) on nearly all the measures of cognitive reflection. Oddly, in Study 2, ACS did not
significantly predict religious belief when other standard demographics were controlled for in a
multiple regression model, but across both studies, the expected relationship was found again.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that nonreligious individuals are collectively better
analytical thinkers than their religious counterparts.
The main purpose of Study 2, though, was to assess the efficacy of the RRS and how well
it could measure the reflective prowess of religious individuals in their domain of expertise,
religion. The RRS moderately positively correlated with the other scales of cognitive reflection,
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indicating that it was measuring cognitive reflection and at least some other component(s). To
this extent, the RRS showed some promise as a measure of cognitive reflection within the
domain of religion. In contrast to the expectation of Hypothesis 3a, however, the RRS and
religious belief were negatively related to each other, indicating that the additional component
that the RRS was measuring was not religious belief. Indeed, in a one-way ANOVA comparing
the performance of theists, agnostics, and atheists on the RRS, agnostics outscored theists, as
would be expected if the RRS were just another measure of cognitive reflection.
In anticipation of this result, the three-item religious familiarity scale was included in
Study 2. It was reasoned that not all religious believers contemplate their religious beliefs to the
same extent. For instance, a religious believer could potentially believe in their religious beliefs
by fiat without much contemplation, whereas a nonbeliever could show great interest in studying
religious concepts and culture without believing any of its precepts. The low correlation between
religious belief and familiarity confirmed that the two concepts are quite different. This
distinction is important, because scores on the RRS were not meant to show who was religious
and who was not; rather, the RRS was meant to positively correlate with familiarity with
religion. Therefore, the nonbeliever familiar with religion could hypothetically outperform the
disinterested believer by virtue of simply engaging in the topics more.
In support of Hypothesis 3b, religious familiarity was positively related to RRS
performance. This relationship was also unique insofar as religious familiarity did not
significantly correlate with any of the other measures of cognitive reflection (although this
finding is somewhat curtailed by the lack of retained significance of religious familiarity in a
multiple regression model with other controls). This evidence indicates that the attempt to make
a measure of cognitive reflection within the domain of religion was at least partially successful.
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No, religious individuals did not suddenly outperform nonbelievers on this measure, as was
anticipated, but those who expressed interest in investigating religious concepts were more likely
to outscore their less interested counterparts, meaning that being familiar with religion gave
some individuals a unique advantage on the RRS (above and beyond even their beliefs).
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CHAPTER IX
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across two studies, a central question was tested: are nonbelievers truly more reflective
thinkers than religious individuals? The results from the replication portions of these studies
indicated that, yes, agnostics and atheists consistently outperform theists on classic measures of
cognitive reflection, such as the CRT and the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning task. The
relationship between religious belief and analytic cognitive style (ACS) was always significantly
negative, with the magnitude hovering just below the middle point of the expected -.18 to -.33
range (Pennycook et al., 2016b). This relationship retained significance, even when controlling
for other important variables like numeracy, self-reported GPA, age, and gender. In terms of
group differences, atheists did not outscore agnostics and theists in all measures (and, in fact,
they only outscored theists in some), but in most measures of cognitive reflection, agnostics
consistently did better than theists. Overall, this replication was successful, with nonbelievers
(mainly agnostics) outperforming believers on nearly all counts of cognitive reflection.
However, the main goal of this research was to determine if there is an element of
familiarity that influences performance on analytic thinking measures. This hypothesis was
explored across the two studies. The purpose of Study 1 was to see if those who were more
familiar with math (i.e., upper-level math majors) would outperform those who were presumably
just as intellectually capable, but relatively not as familiar with math (i.e., upper-level
psychology majors) on the math-based CRT items. Indeed, math students were not fooled by the
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intuitive solutions to the math problems. They significantly outperformed psychology students
on this measure (even after controlling for GPA, numerical ability, and performance on the
general logic syllogisms). This evidence indicates that there is something special about being a
math major that makes them predisposed to scoring well on the math-based CRT, a measure
which does not require sophisticated math knowledge to answer correctly. It is suggested that
this extra factor is familiarity. Presumably, if these same students were given a similar battery of
questions in which dual-process thinking was tested with questions relating to psychology, the
upper-level psychology students would do better than their math student counterparts by virtue
of being more familiar with that domain of knowledge. In short, Study 1 demonstrated, at least
initially, that familiarity is an influential variable that predicts performance on measures of
cognitive reflection. Therein lies the main purpose of Study 2.
The goal of Study 2 was to tease out the unique reflection capabilities of religious
individuals by getting them to reason with content related to their domain of familiarity: religion.
This objective was tested by crafting and analyzing a novel measure of cognitive reflection in the
domain of religion, the Religion Reflection Scale (RRS). Despite showing low internal
reliability, the RRS correlated neatly with the other measures of cognitive reflection in the study.
These correlations were significant enough to suggest that the RRS was tapping into cognitive
reflection, but they were low enough to suggest that it was measuring cognitive reflection
through some other means. This other means was hypothesized to be religious familiarity.
Unfortunately, the relationship between religious beliefs and performance on the RRS was still
negative. A groups comparison between theists, agnostics, and atheists confirmed that agnostics
(and to a lesser extent, atheists) still did better on this measure of cognitive reflection than
theists.
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As was stated before, however, the RRS was meant to relate to familiarity with religion,
not just having religious beliefs. One could presumably be a religious believer and attend
religious services but not mentally engage with the concepts themselves; likewise, one could be a
nonbeliever but show great interest in learning more about the histories, beliefs, and cultures of
other religions. It was hypothesized that, beyond merely religious beliefs, religious familiarity
would positively predict performance on the new RRS. Indeed, self-reported interest in religion
positively related to RRS performance. Interestingly, this relationship was the only one that was
significant; religious familiarity did not significantly relate to performance on any of the other
secular measures of cognitive reflection, including the parallel general syllogistic task. This
evidence suggests that, at least on a small level, being interested in and familiar with religion can
enable one to succeed on a measure of cognitive reflection within the domain of religion.

Limitations
There was a lack of representative sample sizes among the different religious groups. By
virtue of sampling from a predominantly Christian university in the southern United States, this
demographic pitfall was unavoidable. However, if more atheists and agnostics could have been
included (with numbers at least on par with the theists), there could have been less ceiling effects
with respect to the supernatural religious beliefs questionnaire and a more striking effect of
religious belief category on cognitive reflection. These tweaks in sampling may not have
substantially altered the overall results of the studies, but they could have enhanced their
generalizability.
Another limitation was the lack of systematic alterations between Study 1 and Study 2.
As was stated before, the changes to the syllogistic reasoning task should not have significantly
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altered the constructs they were measuring, but they did, in fact, alter some critical elements of
the scale. Primarily, the estimate of reliability of the updated syllogistic reasoning task (and by
extension, the RRS) was extremely poor in Study 2. This downside was somewhat alleviated by
the significant correlations between the updated syllogism tasks and all of the other measures of
cognitive reflection, but the fact still remains that the syllogisms in Study 2 may not have been
reliable. Another non-systematic alteration (and potential limitation) between the studies was the
inclusion of the fourth additional CRT item in Study 2. It was originally removed in Study 1 in
order to lower the number of questions in the study (reducing participant fatigue) and limit the
types of questions that were presented so that only short, easy-to-read questions were included.
For the sake of consistency with past research and for the sake of variability in the CRT
measures as a whole, though, the lengthy and convoluted item made a reappearance in Study 2.
Without repeating these studies over again with these exact alterations, it is difficult to tell
whether any differences in results between Study 1 and Study 2 were due to the differences in
the samples or the novelties of the measures themselves. Fortunately, the primary findings still
replicated, at least to a significant enough degree to suggest that these alterations in the measures
did not substantially diminish their quality in measuring cognitive reflection.
Another limitation, one that has more to do with the utility or generalizability of the
studies and less to do with the design of the research itself, was the volatile nature of the results.
This limitation is specifically in regards to the religious familiarity questionnaire in Study 2.
While the only measure of cognitive reflection that was significantly related to religious
familiarity was the RRS, the magnitude of this relationship was quite small and just hovering on
the line of significant (r = .151, p = .041). With a slightly different sample, this relationship
could have been pushed into the non-significant category.
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Beyond volatility, the magnitude of this correlation is also troubling, because it is so
small. What does a correlation of .152 with a sample of less than 200 people mean in the real
world? That among small groups of people, being familiar with religion only slightly gives one
an edge in solving religious-based cognitive reflection problems? How useful is that
information? Moreover, how useful is the negative correlation between religious beliefs and
ACS when it only exists between -.18 and -.33 (-.2 in this study)? Yes, measures of cognitive
reflection may be better predictors of religious belief than intelligence, but only to a statistically
significant degree (Pennycook, 2014), not to a degree that appears to have any significant impact
on the real world. There is a deeper limitation of meaningfulness that exists in this field of
inquiry. Take, for example, the results of Study 2. Out of 23 items, atheists and agnostics
together answered around 12, whereas theists answered around 10 correctly (Figure 8). Let us
say, though, that instead of 23 tricky questions on a psychology study, this sample was instead
asked to make 23 real world life decisions. These results imply that, on average, nonbelievers
would think reflectively on about half of those decisions, whereas religious individuals would
think reflectively on slightly less than half. Already, the outcomes are suggesting that these
differences in performance between religious groups are marginal, even if they are statistically
significant. Also, who is to say that the decisions on which nonbelievers thought reflectively
were the best decisions? A religious individual could think reflectively over which doctor to
choose but use intuition when selecting a reliable meal at a restaurant, whereas a nonreligious
individual could haphazardly decide to drive under the influence of marijuana or alcohol but
deliberate obsessively over what type of outfit to wear at a dinner party. Just by thinking
reflectively on slightly more issues than religious individuals, nonreligious individuals do not
suddenly get a prize for living the safest life, the healthiest life, or the best life. If anything, the
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best decision one could make could be to don the religious beliefs of their culture, as being alone
in a minority group can be ostracizing and damaging to one’s physical and emotional wellbeing
(Galen, 2015; McBrayer, 2014). The statistically significant, but small, correlations between
peoples’ purported religious beliefs and their performance on cognitive tasks does not indicate
much or account for much in the real world. Granted, this research still has value. The fact that
nonbelievers outscore believers on cognitive reflection tasks in many studies is interesting, but it
bears repeating that these differences are marginal and perhaps not indicative of much. It is
certainly not the case that religious people are substantially cognitively inferior to nonbelievers.

Future Directions
The easiest route to extending this current research would be to find or create the measure
of cognitive reflection on which religious individuals would do better than nonbelievers. The key
may lie in the Wason Card Selection Task (Wason, 1966). As was stated before, when
participants were no longer asked to assess an abstract rule (i.e., if a card has a vowel on one
face, it must have an even number on the opposite face), but were instead asked to police a
familiar law (i.e., if a person is drinking a beer, they must be over 21 years old), most of them
answered the new problem correctly (Cox & Griggs, 1982; Davies et al., 1995). What accounted
for this change? For one, the content changed. Instead of vowels and numbers, a familiar law
involving alcohol and age was introduced. When creating the RRS, it was assumed that content
was all that would matter. Just by reasoning about religious-based items, religious individuals
should have done better than those who were presumably not as familiar with those concepts
(just as math students did better than psychology students on the math-based problems).
However, a second, critical component to this paradigm is missing, and that component is
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context. In the updated Wason card selection task, participants were not just asked to think about
alcohol and ages; instead, they were prompted to police the rule about alcohol and ages and find
the cheaters. In other words, they were asked to think about familiar items in a more familiar
context as well. Pollard and Evans (1987) tested this hypothesis by placing participants in one of
four conditions. The first condition, the Abstract condition, had participants solving the Wason
card selection task with the normal abstract rules (vowel/number). The second condition, the
Policeman condition, was the same updated task where participants were asked to pretend to be
policemen on duty and check whether or not people in a bar were over the legal age
(alcohol/age). As expected, participants in the Policeman condition significantly outperformed
participants in the Abstract condition. In the remaining two conditions, something surprising
happened. In the third condition, the Beers condition, participants were asked to check a drinking
rule without legal enforcement (alcohol/age). In other words, in this condition, the content was
familiar to participants, and they were still asked to assess the rule, but they were asked to do so
outside of the familiar context of policing the rule as an on-duty cop (presumably to bust
cheaters). In the fourth condition, the Security condition, participants were asked to pretend to be
security guards who were policing people with ID cards that had strings of numbers and letters
on both sides (vowel/number). In other words, in this condition, the context of policing was
familiar to the participants but the content of the ID cards they were policing was abstract and
unfamiliar. Amazingly, participants in these last two conditions, where only content or context
was familiarized, did not improve their performance. They did about as well as those in the
Abstract control condition, whereas only those in the Policeman condition had significantly
higher success. This evidence indicates that, in order for a reasoning task to effectively increase
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the scores of any one group, it must incorporate familiar content and familiar context related to
that group.
The RRS was only different from the other measures of belief bias in syllogistic
reasoning in terms of content, not context. Outcomes could change if instead the RRS was
crafted to uniquely pander to the experiences and challenges of religious individuals, both in
terms of content and context. Perhaps instead of asking participants to assume the premises of
the religious syllogisms as true and work out the logic internally, they were instead asked to
evaluate the arguments (i.e., the presented religious syllogisms) of other religious individuals
with different beliefs than theirs. With these new directions, the context would involve policing
the arguments of other religious individuals, not just assessing the merits of unrelatable
syllogisms. With relatable content and context, religious individuals could potentially outscore
nonreligious individuals on this measure. Or, at the very least, the current difference between
them could be attenuated. In a related study, participants of high cognitive ability outscored
participants with low cognitive ability when they were both asked to solve syllogistic reasoning
problems according to the boilerplate “assume the following is true” method of presenting
syllogisms; however, when the instructions were changed to be more situational and involve
non-dichotomous responding, the differences in performances between high and low cognitive
groups disappeared (Evans et al., 2010). This evidence indicates that merely changing the
instructions, or the context in which reasoning problems are presented, can reduce the effects of
belief bias. If the instructions were changed to pander to one group over another, the effects
could be even more profound.
Over the past century (Larson & Witham, 1997; Leuba, 1916; Stirrat & Cornwell, 2013)
scholars have found that most eminent scientists (80-90%) do not believe in a God or higher
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power. This finding is incredibly interesting and leads to a whole new question that has yet to be
resolved: if disbelief is so intimately tied to critical thought, what accounts for the outliers? In
other words, what separates the ~10% believing faction of scientists from the vast majority of
their disbelieving peers? Surely both groups can reason critically! In order to become a
prominent scientist, one must analyze data, think of solutions to problems, and produce
noteworthy results, all of which require one to deeply process information. Cognitive ability
cannot be a reliable predictor of religiosity at this top level. Herein lies a case where domain
specificity has merits. Perhaps some upper-level scientists intuitively believe in God and devote
their reflective powers to their science. Put differently, scientists may be able to distinguish
which domains they choose to reason about. For most, they reason about their science and about
religion and find the latter wanting, whereas for the others, they reason about their science and
intuitively accept their religions without much contemplation. Their reasoning is, thus,
contingent on which domain they are engaged in.
Such an explanation is still wanting, as it fails to account for the deeply religious
theologians who clearly have strong reflective capabilities in the realms of metaphysics,
mathematics, and philosophy. If reflective thought and religiosity were truly so incompatible,
then how come great thinkers like Blaise Pascal, Thomas Aquinas, and St. Augustine slipped
through the cracks? What makes it possible for someone to reflect deeply about religion and still
maintain religious beliefs?

Conclusion
This research deserves consideration in the field of analytical thinking and religiosity,
because it represents an initial attempt to challenge the current paradigm, a paradigm which may
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be partially incorrect. Are nonbelievers truly more reflective thinkers than religious believers?
The initial answer is yes. When given classic measures of cognitive reflection, like the CRT and
belief bias in syllogistic reasoning syllogisms, agnostics and atheists outperform theists
(Pennycook et al., 2016b; though for a cross-cultural challenge of this claim, see Gervais et al.,
2017). However, this finding is limited in scope in terms of the instruments used. Yes, religious
believers fall prey to intuitive pitfalls in math-based and general-knowledge, logic-based
questions, but does this evidence mean they are not reflective thinkers overall? What would
happen if they were asked to reason about questions related to the most fundamental aspects of
their identities? Admittedly, the answer is still disappointing: the attempt in this thesis to show
that religious individuals could outperform nonreligious individuals on a measure of religious
cognitive reflection failed (though religious familiarity could have influenced this relationship).
Regardless of this failure, there is a valuable takeaway from this research that deserves
consideration, and this takeaway is that not all conceivable measures of cognitive reflection have
been exhausted. Finding or creating such a measure that draws out the reflective capabilities of
religious individuals may take years and may seem as futile as finding a needle in a haystack, but
it remains possible that this measure could exist. Such a finding would bring incredible nuance to
the table, further establishing the continuing truth that reality is not black-and-white. Instead,
reality is fluid, and truth is contingent on context. No longer could it be said that nonbelievers are
more reflective thinkers than their believing counterparts. Instead, the prevailing nuanced claim
would be that nonbelievers are more reflective than believers with respect to some, but not all,
measures of cognitive reflection. Again, it remains to be seen what kind of measure this could
be, but the finding of such a measure would be invaluable to those seeking to understand the
refined truth.
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APPENDIX B
DEMOGRAPHICS
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What is your age (in years)?

With what gender do you most identify?

What is your ethnicity?

What is your current major?

What is your academic classification (i.e. sophomore, junior, senior, etc.)?

What is your current GPA?
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RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
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I strongly
disagree (1)

I disagree (2)

I don't know (3)

I agree (4)

I strongly agree
(5)

There is a life
after death. (1)











There is a
heaven where
people who
have led good
lives are
eternally
rewarded. (2)











There is a hell
where people
who have led
bad lives and die
without being
sorry are
eternally
punished. (3)











Religious
miracles occur.
(4)











Angels are
active in the
world. (5)











Demons are
active in the
world. (6)











People have an
immaterial soul,
a part of
themselves that
is beyond their
merely
physiological
and physical
properties. (7)











There is a
devil/Satan. (8)
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What sort of God, if any, do you believe in?
 A personal God
 God as an impersonal force
 A God who created everything, but does not intervene in human affairs
 Don't know whether or not any Gods exist
 Don't know whether any Gods exist, and no one else does either
 I don't believe in Gods of any sort
 I believe that God does not exist

With which of the following do you identify?


















Agnostic
Atheist
Baha'i
Buddhist
Chinese Traditional
Christian
Christian (specifically Catholic)
Christian (specifically Protestant)
Hindu
Humanist
Jewish
Muslim
No religion
Other not listed
Sikh
Taoist
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NUMERACY
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1. What is the result of
5

A)

2
3

B)

7

+

3
4

?

6

C)

12

17

D)

12

5
12

2. What is the result of (−8) ÷ (−2) ?
B)  4

A) 4

3. The double of
A)

3
4

C) 16

D) 0.25

is?

6
8

B)

3

C)

2

9

D)

16

3
8

4. Set A consists of all odd numbers between 8 and 20, whereas set B consists of all numbers less
than 10. How many elements do the two sets share?
A) None

B) 1

C) 2

D) 3

5. Place five red marbles, three green marble and two yellow marbles in a bag. Draw one red
marble out of the bag. Without replacing the marble, what is the probability of drawing one
green marble in a second drawing?
A)

3
10

B)

3

C)

9

4

D)

10

4
9

6. What is the result of the following equation: (5 + 3)x = 0 ?
A) x = 5  3

B) x = 0

C) x =

5
3

7. Which of the following relations is true?
A) 0.01 x 0.01 < 0.01
B) 0.01 x 0.01 = 0.01

C) 0.01 x 0.01 > 0.01
D) 0.01 x 0.01 = 0.1

8. Knowing that xy = 3, which of the following is true?
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D) x = 5 + 3

A) y =

3
𝑥

B) y = 3  x

C) y = 3x

D)

𝑥𝑦
3

=0

9. The value of 0.05 is:
A) Lower than 0
B) Within  1 and 0

C) Higher than 0.1
D) Within 0 and 1

10. By rolling a dice and tossing a coin at the same time, how many combinations are possible?
A) 6 + 2

B) 6 x 2

C) 6 + 6

D) 6 x 6

11. In a school there are 125 students. Out of those students, the number who passed an exam are
116. The percentage of students that failed is:
A) 6.2%

B) 9%

C) 7.8%

D) 7.2%

12. There are four aces in a deck of 40 cards. What is the probability of drawing one ace from
this deck?
A)

1
40

B)

1
4

C)

4
10

D)

4
40

13. When drawing 2 cards (without replacement) from a standard deck of playing cards, the
probability of drawing two kings is:
A) Equal to the probability of drawing one king
B) Higher than the probability of drawing one king
C) Lower than the probability of drawing one king
D) None of the above
14. The value of 0.98 is:
A) Within 1 and 0
B) Lower than 1

C) Higher than 0
D) Within 2 and 1

15. Which is the result of the following operations? [(13  10)2 + (17  20)2 + (10  10)2]
A) 0

B) 18

C) 6
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D) 9

APPENDIX E
BELIEF BIAS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING
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Directions: You are going to receive a series of eight problems. You must decide whether the
stated conclusion follows logically from the premises or not
You must suppose that the premises are all true and limit yourself only to the information
contained in these premises. This is very important.
For each problem, decide if the given conclusion follows logically from the premises. Circle YES
if, and only if, you judge that the conclusions can be derived unequivocally from the given
premises, otherwise circle NO

Premise 1: All things that are smoked are good for the health
Premise 2: Cigarettes are smoked
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health
YES

NO

Premise 1: All unemployed people are poor
Premise 2: Rockefeller is not unemployed
Conclusion: Rockefeller is not poor
YES

NO

Premise 1: All flowers have petals
Premise 2: Roses have petals
Conclusion: Roses are flowers
YES

NO

Premise 1: All animals with four legs are dangerous
Premise 2: Poodles are not dangerous
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs
YES

NO
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Premise 1: All mammals walk
Premise 2: Whales are mammals
Conclusion: Whales walk
YES

NO

Premise 1: All eastern countries are communist
Premise 2: Canada is not an eastern country
Conclusion: Canada is not communist
YES

NO

Premise 1: All animals love water
Premise 2: Cats do not like water
Conclusion: Cats are not animals
YES

NO

Premise 1: All things that have a motor need oil
Premise 2: Automobiles need oil
Conclusion: Automobiles have motors
YES

NO
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APPENDIX F
CRT (ORIGINAL)
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1. A ball and a bat cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost? ____________ cents

2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ______________ minutes

3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake? ______________ days
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APPENDIX G
CRT (ADDITIONAL)
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1. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12
days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? ___________ days

2. Jerry received both the 15th highest and 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are
in the class? ___________ students

3. A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made? ___________ dollars

4. Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after he
invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from
July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has: a.
broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money
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RELIGIOUS FAMILIARITY
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Not at
all

Not very
much

Moderately

Quite a
bit

Very much
so

O

O

O

O

O

Never

Rarely

Occasionally

Often

Very often

How often do you think about
religious issues?

O

O

O

O

O

How often do you keep yourself
informed about religious questions
through radio, television, internet,
newspapers, or books?

O

O

O

O

O

How interested are you in learning
more about religious topics?
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BELIEF BIAS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING: UPDATED VERSION
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Directions: You are going to receive a series of eight problems. You must decide
whether the stated conclusion follows logically from the premises or not
You must suppose that the premises are all true and limit yourself only to the
information contained in these premises. This is very important.
For each problem, decide if the given conclusion follows logically from the
premises. Circle YES if, and only if, you judge that the conclusions can be derived
unequivocally from the given premises, otherwise circle NO

Premise 1: All flowers have petals
Premise 2: Roses have petals
Conclusion: Roses are flowers
YES

NO

Premise 1: All birds have wings
Premise 2: Crows are birds
Conclusion: Crows have wings
YES

NO

Premise 1: All meat products can be eaten
Premise 2: Apples can be eaten
Conclusion: Apples are meat products
YES

NO

Premise 1: All European countries are cold
Premise 2: Mexico is not cold
Conclusion: Mexico is not a European country
YES

NO
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Premise 1: All things that are smoked are good for the health
Premise 2: Cigarettes are smoked
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health
YES

NO

Premise 1: All humans have brains
Premise 2: Cats are not humans
Conclusion: Cats do not have brains
YES

NO

Premise 1: All unemployed people are poor
Premise 2: Bill Gates is not unemployed
Conclusion: Bill Gates is not poor
YES

NO

Premise 1: All animals with four legs are dangerous
Premise 2: Poodles are not dangerous
Conclusion: Poodles do not have four legs
YES

NO
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RELIGION REFLECTION SCALE
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Directions: You are going to receive a series of eight problems. You must decide
whether the stated conclusion follows logically from the premises or not
You must suppose that the premises are all true and limit yourself only to the
information contained in these premises. This is very important.
For each problem, decide if the given conclusion follows logically from the
premises. Circle YES if, and only if, you judge that the conclusions can be derived
unequivocally from the given premises, otherwise circle NO

Premise 1: All things are created
Premise 2: The world is a thing
Conclusion: The world was created
YES

NO

Premise 1: All books with errors were written by people
Premise 2: The Bible was written by people
Conclusion: The Bible has errors
YES

NO

Premise 1: All religious beliefs are sacred
Premise 2: Secular beliefs are not sacred
Conclusion: Secular beliefs are not religious beliefs
YES

NO

Premise 1: All prophets pray
Premise 2: Common religious followers are not prophets
Conclusion: Common religious followers do not pray
YES

NO
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Premise 1: All nonphysical beings do not exist
Premise 2: God is a nonphysical being
Conclusion: God does not exist
YES

NO

Premise 1: All good things are loved by God
Premise 2: Evil-doing is not good
Conclusion: Evil-doing is not loved by God
YES

NO

Premise 1: All beings made in God’s image have souls
Premise 2: Humans have souls
Conclusion: Humans are made in God’s image
YES

NO

Premise 1: All divine beings are nonphysical
Premise 2: Jesus was not nonphysical
Conclusion: Jesus was not a divine being
YES

NO
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